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1	UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
2	SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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4	x
5	In the Matter of:
6	DPH HOLDINGS CORP., ET AL CASE NO. 05-44481-rdd
7	Debtors.
8	x
9	In the Matter of:
10	ACE AMERICAN INSURANCE COMPANY ET AL
11	v CASE NO. 09-01510-rdd
12	DELPHI CORPORATION ET AL
13	x
14	
15	U.S. Bankruptcy Court
16	300 Quarropas Street
17	White Plains, New York
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19	October 16, 2012
20	10:08 AM
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22	BEFORE:
23	HON. ROBERT D. DRAIN
24	U.S. BANKRUPTCY JUDGE
25	ECRO - WILLIE RODRIGUEZ, ET AL

Page 2 1 HEARING re Notice of Agenda - Proposed Seventh-Ninth Omnibus 2 Hearing Agenda 3 4 HEARING re Notice of Agenda - Proposed Fifty-Seventh Claims Hearing Agenda 5 6 7 HEARING re Adversary Proceeding - Defendant's State of Michigan 8 Worker's Compensation Agency and State Michigan Funds Administration's Statement Pursuant to Local Rule 7056-1 of 9 10 Undisputed Facts in Support of Their Motion for Summary 11 Judgment (related document(s) 148) 12 13 Affidavit of Kevin A. Elsenheimer (related document(s) 147, 14 148) filed by Melanie L. Cyganowski on behalf of State of Michigan Funds Administration, State of Michigan Workers' 15 16 Compensation Insurance Agency (related document(s) 159) 17 Declaration of Richard G. Haddad, Esq. in support of Defendants 18 19 State of Michigan Workers' Compensation Agency's and State of Michigan Funds Administration's Motion for Summary Judgment and 20 21 in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment 22 (related document(s) 150) 23 24 25

Page 3 Memorandum of Law of Michigan Workers' Compensation Agency and Michigan Funds Administration in Support of their Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (related document(s) 151) Opposition/Defendants State of Michigan Workers' Compensation Agency's and State of Michigan Funds Administration's Responses to Plaintiffs' Rule 7056-1 Statement and Statement of Disputed Facts that precludes Summary Judgment in favor of Plaintiffs (related document(s) 152) Motion for Summary Judgment Statement of Undisputed Facts (Related document(s) 39, 38, 37, 40) filed by Robert G. Kamenec on behalf of ACE American Insurance Company, Pacific Employers Insurance Company (related document(s) 41) Motion for Summary Judgment Memorandum of Law (related document(s) 40) Motion for Summary Judgment Statement of Undisputed Facts (related document(s) 39, 37, 38) Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Robert G. Kamenec on behalf of ACE American Insurance Company, Pacific Employers Insurance Company (related document(s) 38)

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1	Motion for Summary Judgment Statement of Undisputed Facts
2	(related document(s) 37, 38) filed by Robert G. Kamenec on
3	behalf of ACE American Insurance Company, Pacific Employers
4	<pre>Insurance Company (related document(s) 39)</pre>
5	
6	Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Robert G. Kamenec on
7	behalf of ACE American Insurance Company, Pacific Employers
8	<pre>Insurance Company (related document(s) 38)</pre>
9	
10	Motion for Summary Judgment Notice filed by Robert G. Kamenec
11	on behalf of ACE American Insurance Company, Pacific Employers
12	Insurance Company (related document 37)
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25	Transcribed by: Sheila Orms

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Page 8 1 PROCEEDINGS 2 THE COURT: Please be seated. All right. Good 3 morning, DPH Holdings. 4 MR. OLSHIN: Your Honor, Lou Olshin for ACE American 5 Insurance Company and Pacific Employers Insurance Company. you prefer that we speak from the podium or? 6 7 THE COURT: Wherever you're comfortable. 8 MR. OLSHIN: Well, since as Your Honor knows there are a lot of documents here --9 10 UNIDENTIFIED: I'm sorry, are we taking appearances 11 are we're just getting ready? 12 THE COURT: Well, people can state their name or 13 should state their name and who they represent when they speak. 14 MR. DOUD: Michael Doud on behalf of James Grai, Your 15 Honor, good morning. 16 THE COURT: And that actually prompts something. We 17 have both the omnibus and the claims hearing agenda. There's 18 really nothing on the claims hearing agenda, correct? 19 MR. HOGAN: Your Honor, this is Al Hogan for DPH 20 Holdings. I believe that the summary judgment proceedings in 21 the ACE matter are the only thing that's --22 THE COURT: The only thing that's on? 23 MR. HOGAN: That's correct. 24 THE COURT: Which is in the omnibus agenda? 25 MR. HOGAN: That's correct.

THE COURT: All right. So we should go ahead with the dueling summary judgment motions and I'll hear from the insurers first.

MR. OLSHIN: Thank you, Your Honor, good morning. As Your Honor indicated we're here on ACE/Pacific's motion for summary judgment and the Michigan Defendant's Cross Motion.

ACE/Pacific asked the Court for three forms of relief in its motion for summary judgment. First, with respect to the deductible policies, we asked for a declaration that they did not provide coverage for Delphi Corporation self-insured operations. Alternatively and related to the first claim was a request for the remedy of reformation in the event that that remedy was appropriate.

And third, we asked that the retention policies be declared that they do not drop down, that is, that they don't provide coverage until their self-insured retention amounts are satisfied.

Just a few housekeeping items. We believe that it's undisputed that with respect to the first issue, related to the deductible policies, that the undisputed facts show that there was no deductible policy issued for the period October 1, 2002 to October 1, 2003, and therefore, summary judgment is appropriately entered with respect to that deductible policy.

Next, with respect to the third issue, with respect to the retention policies, we've not seen any contest or argument

contrary to the legal authorities we provided with respect to the retention policies. And, therefore, we believe it's appropriate that under Michigan law the Court enter summary judgment that those retention policies do not drop down and that they don't provide coverage until their self-insured retention limits are satisfied.

Your Honor, I'd like to --

THE COURT: Well, before we move on, both of those points seem to me to be correct, but let me hear from the Michigan defendants on that.

MR. HADDAD: Yes, good morning, Your Honor, Richard Haddad from Otterbourg, Steindler, Houston & Rosen. I'll be speaking on behalf of the Michigan defendants.

With me this morning is my colleague and partner,

Melanie Cyganowski, Dennis Raterink from the Attorney with the

Michigan Funds Administration, and I'd also like to introduce

Your Honor to Kevin Elsenheimer, who is the Director of the

Workers' Compensation Agency and one of the three trustees of

the Michigan Funds Administration.

With respect to those points, I'm not sure what summary judgment there is to give on the 2002/2003 because we don't know that there is a policy, but we certainly don't contest that there is a deductible policy or that there is a policy for that 2002/2003 year.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, but I thought the only basis

Page 11 for the request -- the only defense to the request for summary 1 2 judgment is that deductible policies provide for coverage. 3 MR. HADDAD: Except for that one year. 4 THE COURT: Oh, okay. So that's --5 MR. HADDAD: So what Mr. Olshin began was saying as to 6 one particular year --7 THE COURT: Right. 8 MR. HADDAD: -- and --9 THE COURT: But is there any other basis for that 10 particular year? 11 MR. HADDAD: No. 12 THE COURT: Okay. All right. 13 MR. HADDAD: But with respect to the excess 14 policies --15 THE COURT: Right. 16 MR. HADDAD: -- we do agree and there is common ground that there is no drop down. In other words, to the extent that 17 18 it is a policy in excess of \$5 million of underlying liability, 19 then it should be enforceable and in accordance with its terms 20 to cover liability in excess of the \$5 million. 21 THE COURT: Okay. MR. HADDAD: And I think there is -- that is our 22 23 position. THE COURT: All right. So partial summary judgment 24 25 should be granted then on the insurers' motion on those two

points, i.e., that Ace and Pacific have no liability for the October -- it was October?

MR. OLSHIN: It's October 1, 2002 to October 1, 2003.

THE COURT: October 1, 2002 to October 1, 2003 period under any policy and secondly, that they should be granted a partial summary judgment on whether -- on the request for a declaration that there's no liability under the retention policies until the applicable SIR is satisfied.

MR. OLSHIN: Thank you, Your Honor. Appreciate getting those housekeeping items resolved up front.

I'd like to turn now to what remains with respect to the deductible policy issues. Over the course of the last several years, Your Honor knows that there have been pleadings filed by both the Michigan defendants, the Agency and the Funds, and Delphi Corporation in all of those pleadings have indicated that Delphi Corporation was self-insured in the State of Michigan.

There's also been pleadings that have been filed with Your Honor that Delphi and ACE/Pacific intended that the majority of the operations of Delphi Corporation in the State of Michigan be self-insured, and that only small subsidiaries that did not obtain self-insured authority be covered under the deductible policies.

What I and my colleagues wanted to try to do today,
Your Honor, is accomplish several things. One, I wanted to

provide Your Honor with an analytical framework to assist the Court in trying to organize the material that the Court's been provided with, to the extent that there is any questions with respect to specific policies. I'm here to deal with those.

To the extent the Court needs additional information with respect to affidavits or other evidentiary issues, my partner, Bill Hauer will address those issues, and to the extent we need to get to the issue of reformation, Mr. Kamenec from the Plunkett Cooney law firm will get to those issues.

I think the analytical framework to sort of put into focus the information that the Court's been provided with really present the following issues. The first issue, since we've talked about this Delphi insurance program and its structure is, whether under Michigan law the Delphi insurance program structure is appropriate; i.e., whether the law permits a qualified self-insured parent to insure 90 so percent of its operations and then leave other affiliates or subsidiaries to obtain insurance under a deductible program because those affiliates or subsidiaries have not obtained self-insured authority. I think that's the first issue.

I think the second issue, Your Honor, is what is the source of that authority for that structure. If, in fact, you can create a structure like that, is there authority under Michigan law to allow a Court to conclude that it's appropriate.

The third issue I think is if there is authority, and it is lawful, how does a carrier and an insured utilize or apply that authority to achieve the intended result. And I think, Your Honor, that the fourth issue, which is the issue that we sort of delve into with a lot of documents is did that intended result actually occur.

Now, as an overview to the first issue, that is whether it's appropriate under Michigan law to have the Delphi insurance program as it was structured, I think the Court as an overview can consider Mr. Elsenheimer's testimony in his deposition found at pages 133 and 134, and Mr. Strock (ph), who I understand was the administrator of the funds at pages 23 and 24. DPH Holdings attached those transcripts as Exhibit A and B to their papers, which is document 165 in the adversary proceeding.

And both Mr. Strock and Mr. Elsenheimer agree that a parent company like Delphi Corporation can obtain self-insured authority, and have certain subsidiaries or affiliates that are not self-insured.

So we know in the first instance that at least the director of the agency and the director of the funds agree that the road that ACE and Pacific and Delphi Corporation went down back in 2000 to create the structure is something that actually Michigan law recognizes.

THE COURT: Well, they don't agree they went down that

road, but I think they do agree that you can -- if you do it properly, you can do it, right?

MR. HADDAD: Yes, Your Honor, you can do it; of course, as the document show, as the evidence that we've shown establishes, that's not what they did.

THE COURT: All right. I understand.

MR. OLSHIN: Now, to me it's somewhat ironic and we'll get into the specifics that the State of Michigan and the Agencies and the Funds were all participants in how the program actually operated. And they were participants in the following respects. One, they approved the policy through the Michigan Insurance Department that ACE and Pacific utilized, and that comes from the affidavit of Mr. Grody, who was involved in that approval process. That's reply Exhibit 2.

They granted Delphi Corporation self-insured authority through an application process whereby Delphi Corporation designated those entities for which it asks that self-insured authority be granted, and they designated for purchase by Delphi Corporation the terms of the retention policies that ACE and Pacific actually issued. And those documents can be found in reply Exhibit 6, 7, 17, 18, 29, 30, 31 and 32.

When we look at how the authority and structure is put together under the statute and what ACE and Pacific did, one must I think, begin with the statute. And the relevant statute we believe is MCL 418 621 and there's two parts to that

1 statute, Your Honor.

There is a section -- well, there's at least two that are relevant to our discussion, a Section 2 and a Section 4.

And I have copies of statutes in this small binder because it may be helpful to look at.

THE COURT: That's okay.

MR. OLSHIN: Now, the Michigan defendants really never discuss MCL 418.621(2), nor do they discuss the provisions of the ACE Delphi policy other than the Michigan insurance -- I'm sorry, the Michigan law endorsement. And they don't really discuss any of the other conditions in that policy. And we think it is important to give focus to those provisions.

While the Michigan defendants have attempted to allude to this concept of double coverage and whether it's permissible or not, we think the real legal issue is whether Michigan law allows an insurer to issue a deductible policy which does not insure approved self-insured employers and locations. We think the answer to that is definitely yes. We think it's controlled by 418.621(2), and we think the Michigan defendants have, in fact, indicated that that is an appropriate structure.

THE COURT: Right. No, they've agreed to that.

MR. OLSHIN: Now, when you read that statute, it provides, the State Accident Fund and each insurer issuing an insurance policy to cover any employer not permitted to be a self-insurer under 611, shall insure, cover and protect in the

same policy all businesses, employees, enterprises, and activities of the employer.

Thus, under the statute, the obligation for an insurer to insure all businesses does not apply to a self-insured employer, and did not apply to the Delphi Corporation itself.

THE COURT: Right. It's not based on corporate groups or anything like that. It's by an individual employer.

MR. OLSHIN: Yes, Your Honor. In fact, there is a statute that I believe specifies under Michigan law that an employer is defined as an entity that basically employs, I think it's, three or more employees. My Michigan counsel is shaking their head in the affirmative.

So we then turn to the Michigan law endorsement argument. And we believe, Your Honor, that that argument is based on a misreading of one portion of the statute. The Michigan law endorsement is actually found in 418.621 paragraph 4. So in order to interpret that statute, one must give effect to the wording of the entire statute, in particular 618.621(2).

And Michigan law requires under its ruling of statutory interpretation that the Court must begin with the statute's language. If the statute is clear and unambiguous, the Court assumes that the legislature intended its plain meaning, and the Court should enforce the statute as written. That's the People versus Stone case, 463 Michigan 562, 621 NW2d 702, it's a Michigan Supreme Court case from 2001.

And the Supreme Court in Michigan has further said that in reviewing the statute's language, every word has to be given meaning, and a Court should avoid a construction that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory.

And that's the Wickens versus Oakwood Healthcare System case,
465 Michigan 53, 31 NW2d 686, Michigan 2001, and the Altman versus Meridian Township case, at 439 Michigan 623, 487 NW2d
155.

Thus, Your Honor, in order to examine the Michigan law endorsement, the language of which is set forth 48.621(4), you must read it in the context of the entire statute because it is part of that statute, and a complete reading of the entire statute does not support the Michigan defendants' reading.

Firstly, the Michigan law endorsement as noted, is one paragraph. And when you read it in combination with paragraph 2, it's clear from the language in paragraph 2 that insurers are not required to insure all of the businesses and employees of a self-insured employer like Delphi. And accordingly, ACE/Pacific and Delphi Corporation did not do so.

Reading paragraph 4 in this context, and giving the meaning to the entire statute, it's clear that paragraph 4, the Michigan law endorsement applies to the issuance of an insurance policy to those employers who are not authorized as self-insured. Accordingly, it only applies to the subsidiaries of Delphi Corporation named in the Michigan extension of

information page which were authorized not to be -- I'm sorry, which were not authorized to be self-insured.

THE COURT: Well, I guess the one area here that I'm not sure the Michigan defendants agree with you on is whether the endorsement literally only applies to entities that are not self-insured or whether instead it applies to any entity where there is, in fact, third party insurance. I.e., they say, you could have self-insurance and insurance both. And if you have both, I think they're saying the endorsement applies to the extent of the insurance supplied by the third party.

MR. OLSHIN: Well, I think Your Honor --

THE COURT: Is that your summary of where you are?

MR. HADDAD: Yes, Your Honor, and I can speak to, you know, the 621.2 point or I can wait until Mr. Olshin has completed.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HADDAD: But whatever Your Honor prefers.

THE COURT: What is your response to that?

MR. OLSHIN: My response, Your Honor, is that you have to read the endorsement as a whole and the policy as a whole.

THE COURT: Can I interrupt you?

MR. OLSHIN: Yes.

THE COURT: I think they would agree with you that the fact that ACE or some other insurer provides insurance to subsidiary X, does not mean that under the Michigan rule

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Page 20 1 endorsement, it's somehow sucked in to providing insurance to 2 every subsidiary or every business related to subsidiary X, but 3 only to subsidiary X. I think they'd agree with that, right? MR. HADDAD: Yes. THE COURT: It's not some black hole that you get 5 6 pulled into by if you provide insurance to any entity. On the 7 other hand, I think they would say that if you do agree to provide insurance to subsidiary X, then you have -- then you're 9 stuck with the Michigan endorsement for that subsidiary --10 MR. OLSHIN: Well --11 THE COURT: I think you don't agree with -- I don't 12 think you disagree with either? 13 MR. OLSHIN: No, we agree that the Michigan law 14 endorsement, the first line of which, refers the reader to the 15 information page of the policy because it says in the Michigan 16 law endorsement that this endorsement is part of the policy 17 because the information page at item 3(a) --18 THE COURT: Well, let's not get into the information 19 page. MR. OLSHIN: Well --20 21 THE COURT: I'm just now talking about the statute. don't think the statute --22 23 MR. OLSHIN: I'm talking about the statute, Your 24 Honor, and I'm talking about it in the context that the statute 25 is clear that an insurer is not insuring self-insured

employers. So the way the endorsement --

THE COURT: I'm not sure I agree with that. Does it actually say that an insurer can never insure self-insured employers? I don't think that's right.

MR. OLSHIN: I think what it's saying is that the language of the statute is that you're issuing a policy that's not covering self-insured employers, and the way we know that is that the Michigan Insurance Department approved the general section of the policy which indicates under the location section that it doesn't cover self-insured locations.

THE COURT: Yeah, but that's a separate -- that's a contract interpretation issue. I'm just focusing on the statute right now. I think that, again, the Michigan defendants agree with you that the Michigan endorsement statute, which is echoed in the Michigan law endorsement in the policies, does not pull an insurer into insuring every subsidiary or affiliate of an insured, and that it only requires the insurer to provide the coverage for its insured.

And so I think you both agree on that. What I'm trying to explore is whether you contend that the Michigan statute literally says it's a binary choice, you either are self-insured, in which case the Michigan law endorsement doesn't apply, or you're insured, but you can never be covered by the Michigan law endorsement for a subsidiary that is self-insured even if you've issued insurance for that subsidiary.

And I think that's where they would disagree with you, because they're saying, under the policies, you did issue insurance for these entities.

MR. OLSHIN: And I'm saying several things. One, I'm saying that 621(2) in combination with 418.611, which provides the either or choice of coverage provides the writing of this policy so that in fact it doesn't cover and protect in that same policy all businesses, employees, enterprises and activities of the self-insured employer.

And secondarily I'm saying, that considering the policy, and I don't think you can separate out, Your Honor, one page from a 400 page policy that has an insuring agreement which excludes self-insured locations which is consistent with 418.621(2). So these pieces of the policy, again all approved by the Michigan Insurance Department, work in combination.

THE COURT: All right. So it's not -- it's really not 418.621(4) you're relying on. You're relying on the 418.611.

MR. OLSHIN: Well, I'm relying on 611 and I'm also relying on 621(2).

THE COURT: But --

MR. OLSHIN: And I'm relying on the wording of the endorsement itself, which says, go to the information page of the policy, look at item 3(a). Item 3(a) lists Michigan. Now in some years, in fact, the 2001 --

THE COURT: All right. Before we get to the policy, I

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just think we should nail this down. I don't see a statutory 1 2 basis in 418.621(2) or (4) for saying that the Michigan 3 endorsement doesn't apply to any insurer that insures a selfinsured debtor company. I just don't -- it's not there. 4 5 MR. OLSHIN: Well, Your Honor, we --6 THE COURT: I mean it gives you authority. It does 7 say that the endorsement only applies where you're issuing 8 insurance. I get that. It's covered by the policy. But I 9 don't see the corollary argument that I think you're trying to 10 make, which is that if you provide a policy to a self-insured, 11 you don't have to comply with 621. I mean --12 MR. OLSHIN: Well, I think 621(2) --13 THE COURT: -- how do you even get to that? 14 MR. OLSHIN: -- says to cover any employer not 15 prevented to be a self-insured. And it's saying it's a self-16 insurer, you don't have to cover and protect in the same 17 policy, all the businesses, employees, and enterprises. 18 THE COURT: But 621(2) doesn't say anything about the 19 endorsement. MR. OLSHIN: Well --20 21 THE COURT: It just says that --22 MR. OLSHIN: I think our point, Your Honor, is you 23 can't read 621(4) in a vacuum. You have to read it in 24 combination with the very section of the statue which proceeds 25 item 4. Because it's saying in the Michigan law endorsement

Page 24 1 that it's providing coverage in accordance with the policy. 2 When you look at the policy, the policy's general section 3 provides that self-insured locations aren't covered. When 4 you --THE COURT: But, wait, that's not in 621, right? What 5 6 in 621 says that? MR. OLSHIN: Well, the endorsement that they're 7 8 relying upon says that. THE COURT: No, but -- all right. I'm going to do 9 10 this very slowly, okay, maybe I'm missing something here. 621, 11 paragraph 2 says "The state accident fund and each insurer 12 issuing an insurance policy to cover any employer not permitted 13 to be a self-insurer, shall insure, cover and protect in the 14 same insurance policy all the businesses, employees, 15 enterprises, and activities of the employer." 16 Okay. So you're saying here that this requirement 17 only applies where you're not permitted to be a self-insurer? 18 That's really what you're saying? 19 MR. OLSHIN: Yes. 20 THE COURT: Okay. 21 MR. OLSHIN: If you're a self-insurer, then under 621(2) you don't have an obligation in the policy to insure, 22 23 cover, and protect in the same policy all the businesses. And that's not overridden by 621(4). And 621(1) talks about 24 25 insurance --

Page 25 1 THE COURT: But can I stop you? 2 MR. OLSHIN: Yes. 3 THE COURT: 2 says that you have to, unless the employer is a self-insurer --4 MR. OLSHIN: Correct. 5 6 THE COURT: -- the insurer issuing the insurance policy for the employer has to cover everything, okay. Has to 7 8 cover --9 MR. OLSHIN: Then if you're not a self-insured --10 THE COURT: -- all the businesses, employees, 11 enterprises, and activities of the employer. 12 MR. OLSHIN: I just want to make sure I understand 13 what Your Honor said. So if you posit the hypothetical where 14 you issue a policy to an entity that's not an approved self-15 insurer --16 THE COURT: Right. 17 MR. OLSHIN: -- you cover everything. 18 THE COURT: Right. 19 MR. OLSHIN: We agree with that. Because the --20 THE COURT: You can't just cover half the employees, you have to cover them all. 21 22 MR. OLSHIN: Right. Because the intent of the Michigan law endorsement which is similar in most states --23 24 THE COURT: Well, let's stop for a second. 25 MR. OLSHIN: -- is you don't want an employee to move

Page 26 1 or an employer to move employees to some other location --THE COURT: Right. 2 3 MR. OLSHIN: -- and create some sort of a false 4 employer and --5 THE COURT: Right. 6 MR. OLSHIN: -- say they're not covered under the Act. 7 THE COURT: Right, okay. 8 MR. OLSHIN: That's the intent. 9 THE COURT: It does not say that you may not issue 10 insurance. You may not issue a policy to an entity that is a 11 self-employer -- I mean, a self-insurer. It doesn't prohibit 12 the issuance of insurance to an entity that is a self-insurer. 13 MR. OLSHIN: Well, I think 621(1) says your issuance 14 of compensation provided in this Act, and the compensation 15 provided in this Act takes you to 611. 611 --16 THE COURT: Well, before we get to 611, I just want to 17 focus on 621. 18 MR. OLSHIN: I am focusing on 621. 19 THE COURT: Okay. 20 MR. OLSHIN: Because I'm saying you have to read --21 THE COURT: All right. MR. OLSHIN: -- all the sections --22 23 THE COURT: But before we get there --MR. OLSHIN: -- of the --24 25 THE COURT: -- I think your argument does depend on

interpretation of 611, but I want to make sure that that's the only thing it depends on. Because when you go -- so 2 does not prohibit the issuance of insurance for a self-insurer, except by one's reference to the other provisions of this Act, right? There's nothing in 2 that prohibits the issuance of -- by ACE of insurance to a self-insurer.

MR. OLSHIN: Well, it doesn't use the word prohibit but I think the fair meaning of that is it's talking about insurers that are issuing insurance policies to employers who are not authorized self-insurers.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. OLSHIN: That's what I think 2 is saying.

THE COURT: All right. That's fine. And then 4 says,

"each policy of insurance covering worker's compensation shall

contain this endorsement." So, I mean, unless some other

statutory provision prohibits the issuance of a policy to a

self-insured, then I think 4 applies.

MR. OLSHIN: Well, we don't think it applies because we think one, 621(1) talks about every contract for insurance of the compensation provided in this Act.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. OLSHIN: And when you go to 611, which talks about what are the options of what kinds of insuring arrangements are appropriate, that's where you get into the either or concept.

THE COURT: Well, it doesn't say or. It doesn't say

or.

MR. OLSHIN: Well, it's either you're an employer who obtains insurance through a private insurer --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. OLSHIN: -- or you're an authorized self-insurer, and the Michigan defendants pointed out, you can also have a pooling arrangement for authorized self-insurers, but that's not really relevant to this case.

THE COURT: But it doesn't say "or," so I think you're putting a lot of emphasis on the "either" and suggesting that this is in the disjunctive. I mean no one's cited any cases to say that you're prohibited from doing this. Right?

MR. OLSHIN: Well, I think we cited the McQueen case where someone tried to argue that somehow there was a drop down and they found there wasn't one because under the statute, you can't read 621(4) in the self-insured arena to require a drop down.

THE COURT: Okay. But that's -- because the statute -- because the policy didn't have a drop down.

MR. OLSHIN: Well, they were trying to argue there was one, and they obviously came to the conclusion that there wasn't. And that 621(4) didn't require that there was a drop down.

THE COURT: Okay. But I mean we know that, and in fact, this happened with the retention policies. Under the

Page 29 1 statute, Michigan can require a self-insured to get more 2 insurance, to get insurance from a third party, among other 3 things. MR. OLSHIN: They could only require certain forms of 5 insurance. They can't require the obtaining of a deductible 6 policy. If you read the statute, it's very direct that the 7 type of security or policies that the Michigan defendants, and particularly the Agency or Funds, could require an approved 9 self-insured to obtain as a condition of obtaining that 10 approval. THE COURT: Well, which -- can we turn to that 11 12 section? 13 MR. OLSHIN: I need to find it for Your Honor, but 14 there is a section that provides that. I apologize not to have 15 it handy. 16 THE COURT: I probably do need your book on this one. 17 UNIDENTIFIED: 611(1)(a). 18 MR. OLSHIN: Huh? 19 UNIDENTIFIED: 611(1)(a). 20 MR. OLSHIN: 611(1)(a). 21 THE COURT: Oh, okay. 22 MR. OLSHIN: Yeah, it says, "If the director 23 determines it to be necessary, the director shall require the 24 furnishing of a bond or other security in reasonable form and

amount. Such security as may be required by the director may

be provided by furnishing specific excess insurance, aggregate insurance coverage through a carrier authorized to write in the state in an amount acceptable to the director, a security bond, an irrevocable letter of credit in the format acceptable to the bureau, and claims payment guarantees."

So they're not talking about deductible policies, and the reason they're not is because as Your Honor will recall from the insurance agreement motion, when you obtain this kind of deductible policy, the insured is required to post collateral to secure the deductible obligation.

So the program would not make any sense in terms of self-insurance if the Michigan defendants could approve self-insured authority, assess the insured on the basis of granting that authority, and then require the insured to obtain what is a fairly significant cost-sensitive product, a deductible policy, which requires, in and of itself, collateral.

So that concept sort of butts heads against one another because the employer then would say, why get self-insured authority if I have to buy a deductible policy, I'll just buy a deductible policy. It would make no sense to have --

THE COURT: Well, if the State felt that it needed more assurance that there would actually be payment because of the financial condition of the insured.

MR. OLSHIN: Well, they could do what was authorized

in the statute. They could either one, preclude them from being a self-insured, which then would force them into a deductible program, which would make sense. Or allow them to -- or require them like occurred here, to purchase a self-insured retention policy which comparatively is significantly less expensive than having a deductible. Because the other sort of conflict here is to say the Funds will collect for a period of time, I think the numbers are when you add them up from our reply exhibits, \$6.6 million. While we obtain premium of \$14,000 based on our charging premium to the small subsidiaries that weren't authorized to be self-insured.

And then to come full circle and say, guess what, Delphi, we collected these assessments for 9 or 10 years, but you, ACE, take the risk.

THE COURT: Well, let me -- I want to explore that too. But -- on the premiums. But on the issue of whether 418.611(1) precludes using more than one of the three methods, Mr. Eisenberger (ph) says in his declaration that, in fact, there are many instances where a self-insured also has insurance.

MR. OLSHIN: I think the ratio, as I understand the numbers, is something like a comparison of roughly 2,000 to 200.

THE COURT: Right. But it's not -- I guess the issue is, they don't seem to think it's precluded by the statute.

MR. OLSHIN: Well, I think the reality is that they looked at some records, and some of the records they gave us basically said, oh, you know what, you're self-insured up to point A, and then the period of self-insurance was like 1 to 30 days, where it apparently appeared that the employer transitioned from a period of self-insured approval to a period of obtaining private insurance.

So I don't think you can draw any conclusion as to the legality based on those records. I think all you can do is look at it and say, can you issue a policy and is it appropriate under Michigan law to issue a policy where you're not insuring all of the entities because they are self-insured. And I think the answer is yes, and our policy gets you there when you consider all of its terms and conditions.

THE COURT: Well, no, that's -- I mean, that's -- I thought you were going somewhere else, which is we're precluded from insuring self-insured entities.

MR. OLSHIN: Well, we think we are precluded, and we think we're precluded because that's the way the Michigan Insurance Department approved our policy.

THE COURT: Well, except they -- Mr. Elsenheimer says they've approved other policies where there's insurance for self-insureds.

MR. OLSHIN: Well, I don't think there's any evidence that there's been an approval.

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MR. OLSHIN: I think the only evidence is what occurred with respect to the ACE specific policy, which is the policy that was approved. And whether they approved, even if they did, some other policy formulation is really irrelevant --

THE COURT: Well, no, he says, "In fact, I'm aware of other entities in addition to Delphi who were both approved self-insurers and who have also obtained coverage from a third party insurer."

MR. OLSHIN: Well, maybe, Your Honor, I misinterpreted your statement. What I was responding to is the fact that our policy approved by the Michigan Insurance Department versus Grody reply Exhibit 2, provides what it does. And what it provides is that self-insured locations are not insured.

THE COURT: Okay. But that's -- again, I'm just --

MR. OLSHIN: No, I understand but I think --

THE COURT: You all made a statutory argument besides the interpretation of the policy.

MR. OLSHIN: We did --

THE COURT: The statutory -- and the statutory argument is that, in fact, Delphi or the Delphi entities that were self-insured were prohibited from obtaining third party insurance.

MR. OLSHIN: And that's what we think the statutes in combination mean.

1 THE COURT: Okay.

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MR. OLSHIN: And that's why we think our policy was written the way it was written and approved the way it was approved.

THE COURT: Okay. Now, on the latter point, there is a contradictory statement in the evidence, so it really just is a matter of statutory interpretation for purposes of a summary judgment motion.

MR. OLSHIN: I don't think there is any contradictory evidence about the approval of insurance policies. There may be this small universe of entities that Mr. Elsenheimer is saying somehow obtained what they considered to be double coverage. But that doesn't mean that -- we've never seen those policies.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. OLSHIN: We don't know what they say whether approved, not approved.

THE COURT: Well, no, but that's what a trial would be for.

MR. OLSHIN: Well, I don't think you need a trial on that point because I think what you have to determine is what does this policy say.

THE COURT: Well, okay, that's a separate point.

We'll get to that, believe me. Then on the -- but I'm sure Mr.

Haddad will address the "either" and whether it means

disjunctive or not.

But the second point, you were talking about the unfairness on the premiums.

MR. OLSHIN: I'm saying the evidence is undisputed, that Delphi never paid a premium for a deductible policy that covered all of Delphi --

THE COURT: Right, \$14 or \$316.

MR. OLSHIN: I think it's like \$14,000 that they paid --

THE COURT: A total of \$14,000 but for individual policies it was tiny.

MR. OLSHIN: Correct.

THE COURT: So on that score, I think what the Michigan defendants argue is the following. That was perfectly appropriate as a premium when it looked like Delphi was going to be the primary one, that it was going to pay because it was in good financial shape, and Delphi was just getting this extra policy as a back-up. And that's why the premium would be so low because in all likelihood Delphi would pay. What is your response to that?

MR. OLSHIN: Well, my response is several points. One is they certainly didn't assess their self-insured assessments on that basis, that oh, there's the possibility of double coverage here. So therefore, we will charge Delphi a less amount than --

THE COURT: On its --

MR. OLSHIN: On its assessments on the basis that somehow there's double coverage. Because these forms, of course, were at the Agency, according to them, since the year 2000.

My second response would be is that it's clear from the documentation that the only premiums assessed were the premiums assessed for the non-approved self-insured employers, and you know that, Your Honor, from the Michigan information pages which sets forth the individual entities and with respect to those individual entities, it sets forth the individual premiums.

So you know just looking at the very -- you don't even have to go outside to extrinsic evidence, you know from looking at reply Exhibits 11, 12, 21, 37, 22, 23, and 24, when you find the Michigan extension of information pages, that the entity reference on Reply Exhibit 11 for 2000 to 2001 deductible policy, Packard Hughes Interconnect and Delphi Diesel System Corp, which were the only two entities listed and the only premiums calculated for, that there was no indication that the entire company was being insured and rated.

Similarly, if you go to the 2001/2002 policy, which is
Reply Exhibit 12, you'll find the specific entities Allied
Single Environmental Catalyst, Packard Hughes Interconnect,
Delphi Diesel System Corporation with the individual

Page 37 calculation of what their estimated premium is. Again, no 1 2 reference at all to a premium calculation for the entire 3 Delphi. And that's true with respect to all of the policies 4 that are provided in Reply Exhibits 11, 12, 21, 37, 22, 23 and 5 24. THE COURT: So if -- and then your second point I 6 7 guess is that if at this point the two insurers were found to 8 have insured not only the self -- I'm sorry, the non-self-9 insured entities against which those premiums were calculated, 10 but the self-insured ones as well, the insurers would be left 11 holding the bag because they're stuck with the premiums they 12 paid. MR. OLSHIN: We'd be left holding a bag or don't want 13 14 to go there in this proceeding, we have an administrative 15 expense claim, but. 16 THE COURT: But what is that for? MR. OLSHIN: That's for potential calculation if 17 there's some conclusion that, in fact, we have responsibility 18 19 under the policies. 20 THE COURT: So would you -- you would recalculate the premiums then or? 21 22 MR. OLSHIN: No, I didn't say we'd recalculate it. We'd proceed with our administrative expense claim. 23 24 THE COURT: But how would --25 MR. OLSHIN: Well, we would be left effectively not

Page 38 1 being able to collect a premium that we would've collected. 2 And not being able to collect collateral that we would have 3 obtained to secure the deductible policies. THE COURT: Well, let me make sure I understand that. Because there wasn't collateral posted? 5 MR. OLSHIN: Correct. 6 7 THE COURT: Then there wouldn't be collateral. MR. OLSHIN: The collateral that was posted was based 9 on the concept --10 THE COURT: On the uninsured ones, the non-self-11 insured ones. 12 MR. OLSHIN: Correct. 13 THE COURT: And what would the administrative claim be 14 for? MR. OLSHIN: The administrative claim relates to 15 16 claims that may -- claims that we may have to pay that would 17 arise if, in fact, we had the exposure that the Michigan 18 defendants are alleging we had. 19 THE COURT: But is that -- so is -- but what -- is 20 that based on what, subrogation, or what? 21 MR. OLSHIN: That would be the amounts that would be within the deductible obligation of the policy. 22 23 THE COURT: The deductible amounts. 24 MR. OLSHIN: Right. THE COURT: Okay. All right. Because you would be 25

Page 39 1 paying those. 2 MR. OLSHIN: Correct. And the way the --3 THE COURT: Under the endorsement? MR. OLSHIN: Under the --THE COURT: If the endorsement were said to apply, 5 you'd be paying those deductible amounts. 6 7 MR. OLSHIN: Correct. 8 THE COURT: And your argument is that that's a 9 different -- that that's not anything like a premium? 10 MR. OLSHIN: Correct. 11 THE COURT: The insurance would be based upon some 12 theory that you'd be reimbursed for the deductible amounts? 13 MR. OLSHIN: Right. 14 THE COURT: Insurance is always based on a calculation 15 of what an appropriate premium is. 16 MR. OLSHIN: And coming back to your question about 17 what are the other indications that the full Delphi wasn't 18 paying a premium, I guess we have to give some credence to the 19 fact that Delphi, DPH Holding itself says that, in fact, was 20 the case. That they were paying premium based upon the 21 entities that were not authorized to be self-insured, and in 22 addition to the policy, the other way you know that, and we 23 supplied some of this information in the reply exhibits. 24 If you look at the Aon Delphi submission in 2001 and

2004, they clearly break out Delphi as a self-insurer from the

small entities that they intended to be covered under the policy, and in fact, the entities that were listed on the Michigan extension of information page.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, I think we should next turn to the policies themselves, but before we do that, maybe it makes sense it deal with the statutory argument, the argument that 418.611 precludes self-insured entities from obtaining insurance.

MR. HADDAD: Your Honor, thank you, Richard Haddad.

I'm happy to speak to that. We do think the issues are

somewhat interrelated, but to come focus right to Your Honor's

question --

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HADDAD: -- the statute doesn't say it. The statute doesn't say it's exclusive. No case has so held that it is exclusive. McQueen certainly doesn't address the issues whatsoever. And thirdly, it's undisputed, undisputed and recognizing that we're here today on a summary judgment, it's a burden to lay bare your proof, it is undisputed that, in fact, a couple of a hundred Michigan employers choose for whatever reason to be self-insured and get third party insurance for a period of time.

In some instances, it's a short period of time. In other instances, it is a long period of time, and Mr.

25 Elsenheimer references --

THE COURT: Well, do I know anything about the period of time? I just have I think the one paragraph in his declaration.

MR. HADDAD: Well, we did the --

THE COURT: I know both of you have been talking about this.

MR. HADDAD: There's one paragraph in his moving declaration that Your Honor read from. Mr. Elsenheimer also submitted on Friday, trying to think what day that was, on Friday a reply declaration, in which he put forth the list of 211 employers who have chosen to be both insured and self-insured. And we produced, in response to the ACE document request, the Agency's records establishing each of those companies over a period of time.

THE COURT: But that list doesn't say what type of insurance it was or how long it lasted.

MR. HADDAD: It does so. It would show the amount of length of time because you have the documents, the State's records do reflect the point in time, both that someone's an approved self-insurer and also the point in time that they have third party insurance. So it does -- the documents that we produced do reflect that. What we've attached to the affidavit is the list, the list of employers.

THE COURT: But the list of -- I mean, I don't have that. I don't have the list of the names.

MR. HADDAD: You don't have the list of the names, that's correct. We didn't give you the burden. There was hundreds and hundreds of pages of records that show that this happens. You know, does every employer choose to do it, no, everyone doesn't choose to do it.

And I think Your Honor's questions of Mr. Olshin did answer -- address some of those points, that both 611 does not preclude it, it is not exclusionary. 621 similarly --

THE COURT: Well, before we --

MR. HADDAD: Okay.

THE COURT: Before we get -- I mean, just on 611 --

MR. HADDAD: Yeah.

THE COURT: -- what is your response to his point that paragraph 1 seems to limit what the commissioner can impose on a self-insured when there's a feeling of financial insecurity. Would you say that's just dealing with that specific situation?

MR. HADDAD: I think it does. It says, you can require an excess policy which was done here. It doesn't say you can't do other things, but putting that aside, the question here is not what was -- you know, whether Delphi was required to be both self-insured and to get insurance. But, in fact, what is Your Honor to do when presented with a situation where, in actuality, Delphi was both insured and got self-insurance. Because 621(4) says, "Each policy of insurance covering worker's compensation in this state shall contain the following

provisions." It doesn't say --

THE COURT: So it's just tied to a policy. It doesn't --

MR. HADDAD: Each policy. It's not limited to each if you're self-insured or if you're not self-insured, it says each. And 621(2) that Mr. Olshin referenced, and I think Your Honor read the whole section, and I think it's correct to read the entirety of 621(2) because you can't just stop halfway through, and certainly can't assume the converse, which is what the ACE argument is here.

But what 621(2) says is that if you are not an approved self-insurer, then you can only get a single policy. If they want the same insurance policy, the company wants to make sure you get -- the state wants to make sure that if you're not a self-insurer, you get one policy, the same single policy that covers all the businesses within the state. 621(2) is not limited of 621(4). If anything, 621(4) is expansive, because 621(4) reads very clearly, each policy of insurance covering worker's compensation shall contain the following provisions.

And, in fact, and in fact, as a matter of contract, and I know Your Honor doesn't want to jump to the contract just yet, but in fact, each policy that we're talking about today contains those very policy provisions signed by the authorized agent of ACE and incorporated in and made part and parcel of

each and everyone of those policies.

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THE COURT: Okay. All right. So why don't we turn to the policies which --

MR. OLSHIN: I'd be happy to do, Your Honor. I would like to respond to one thing in clarification of opposing counsel. And that was the statement that each policy in 621(4) includes even retention policies. That's just fundamentally wrong, because in fact, you can look at all of our retention policies. None of them have the Michigan law endorsement, and the reason they don't have the Michigan law endorsement is because of 621(2). Because those are policies that are issued to self-insured employers and the way the Act we believe works is in combination between 621(1), (2) and (4) and 611, you're basically picking one of the two systems because 621(4) is not an override of any of the other sections. You have to read it in combination with it. And that's what Michigan statutory construction law provides for.

MR. HADDAD: May I just --

THE COURT: yes.

MR. HADDAD: Just -- and I don't like to interrupt,

21 but to --

THE COURT: No, that's --

MR. HADDAD: -- focus Your Honor specifically on this.

The excess policy is not a provision of worker's compensation,

it's a reimbursement provision designed to provide additional

protection to the State to make sure that they're good for any liability that exceeds the underlying amounts on the primary insurance.

So the excess policies don't have this endorsement, but that's just not the nature of what excess policy is. I mean, if everybody went -- if an insurer went belly up, the self-insurance is still responsible. I mean, you know, you have to look at it -- what's the nature of excess insurance. It doesn't alleviate the underlying liability and we've agreed as to what the effect of the excess insurance is here in this case.

MR. OLSHIN: Well, I was --

THE COURT: Let me just --

MR. OLSHIN: I was responding to the comment that somehow you could read 621(4) to include -- and the use of the word "each" as having some sort of expansive reach as to everything, and it clearly does not. And that's why we believe that our interpretation of the statute is correct.

THE COURT: Well, the -- I mean, the retention policies do refer to worker's compensation, that's what they cover.

MR. HADDAD: Well, as opposed to, you know, a car crash or a D&O or anything else, sure, that's -- and they reference an amount in excess of a -- you have to come -- you have to tie it back to some factual scenario clearly, you know,

a particular type of insurance.

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THE COURT: But the -- I mean, 621(4) says, "Each policy of insurance covering worker's compensation."

MR. HADDAD: But it's excess. It's not the primary level of coverage. And if the excess carrier were to go belly up, it doesn't relieve the self-insurer. I mean, that's sort of the credit risk that the State takes, when they assess the self-insurance application.

MR. OLSHIN: Which really, Your Honor, I think gets to the point in 621(1) that talks about "insurance of the compensation provided in this Act," and in the case of a self-insurer like Delphi Corporation, neither the deductible policy nor the retention policy was providing compensation to self-insurers because that worker's compensation is not required under the Act, because they become authorized self-insurers.

THE COURT: Okay. So why don't we turn to the policies then. My exhibit book is a little bit out of order, it has 2001 and then 2008.

MR. OLSHIN: Well, it's not out of order, I did that purposely.

THE COURT: Well, no, I was going to say out of order chronologically, but I think I understand the reason.

MR. OLSHIN: All right. So perhaps I could run Your Honor through.

25 THE COURT: Okay.

Page 47 1 MR. OLSHIN: If you have -- do you have the binder 2 that has Reply --3 THE COURT: Yeah. MR. OLSHIN: -- Exhibit 11 in it? 4 5 THE COURT: Well, I have the binder with all the 6 policies in it, so. 7 MR. OLSHIN: All right. 8 THE COURT: That's what I've marked up. 9 MR. OLSHIN: Well, I'll refer --10 THE COURT: The first one is Exhibit 11 which is in 11 this binder which is the 2000 policy. 12 MR. OLSHIN: Right. What we tried to do, Your Honor, 13 if you attempted to navigate the CD, you'll know that these 14 policies are like I don't know, 2 or 300 pages long because as 15 Your Honor is aware, Delphi had operations throughout the 16 United States, and these were multi-state policies that were 17 designed to cover specific Delphi operations in those states 18 that didn't that didn't qualify as self-insurers. 19 So the way this policy is set up, if you begin with 20 the 2000 policy, is you have the first page which is Bates 21 number ACE policy 00254, and in this case, you'll see on the 22 information page which we term it item 1, the insured, Delphi Automotive System Corporation, and you have some handwriting 23 24 above it, that says Packard Hughes, Delphi Diesel, see audit.

It's a little hard to read see audit, but I think that's what

Page 48 1 it says. 2 And then you have under the classifications the 3 various states that are insured under this policy or the operations in the insured, and you'll notice that, in fact, this is a multi-state policy listing several states, one of 5 which is Michigan where the estimated annual premium is a grand 6 7 total of \$316. 8 So the question then becomes how does this --9 THE COURT: I'm sorry. You're going to have to go 10 back because maybe my book doesn't have everything. 11 For 2001, I have, again it's Bates stamped 00254. 12 MR. OLSHIN: Okay. 13 THE COURT: Which is -- and you're right, it says item 14 1, the insured and it lists Packard Hughes/Delphi Diesel and it 15 lists Delphi Automotive System Corporation. 16 MR. OLSHIN: Right. And then there's a block in the 17 center --18 THE COURT: And item 3 says -- 3A, "a worker's 19 compensation insurance Part 1 of the policy -- " I'm sorry, 3A, 20 "worker's compensation insurance: Part 1 of the policy applies 21 to the worker's compensation law of the states listed here per 22 information page attached." 23 MR. OLSHIN: Right. 24 THE COURT: Okay. 25 MR. OLSHIN: So that is referring the reader from the

very first page of the policy to what is called the individual state information pages. And in this policy, if you were to look at it, you would find in alphabetical order every state beginning with Alabama through Washington. So what we've included in here is the excerpts for Michigan. When you turn to the Michigan information page, it's Bates number ACE policy 00348. And you'll see in the middle section under item 3, it's designating the State of Michigan. And in the classification sections, it's listed Packard Hughes Engineering Service and then it has some information. It's basically telling you what kind of employees are being rated. For Packard Hughes, it's architects or engineers. And then it has Delphi Diesel Systems, and it lists the kinds of employees that are rated under this policy. In this case, it's sales persons, collectors, messengers, folks in that category.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. OLSHIN: And --

THE COURT: How do I know that this is the Michigan information page?

MR. OLSHIN: Because in item 3.1, it specifies Michigan. Item 3, it says "worker's comp insurance part 1 of the policy applies to the worker's compensation law of the states listed here, Michigan."

THE COURT: Okay. And you're representing to me that there are other pages to this policy that would list say

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Florida or New York or et cetera?

MR. OLSHIN: Yes. You know that from the very first page of the policy, 254, so if you'd opened up the CD and you walked through the policy, they're basically all set up in the same way. In the first part of the policy there is the general insuring agreement, the most relevant section of which is found at, in this policy, page 257, ACE policy 257. That has the locations provisions that I made reference to previously.

And if you walk through the policy, you would find state information pages for each of the states, Alabama or Arizona, California, Colorado, they're all in alphabetical order, and then eventually you would get to Michigan. And after Michigan, obviously there would be the other states.

But in this case, page 348 is the Michigan information page, and on that information page, you find the rating of the entities that are covered under the policy. And in this particular case, it's Packard Hughes Engineering Service and Delphi Diesel Systems.

And if you turn the page, you'll -- where it says,

Your Honor, "premium basis, estimated total, annual

remuneration," that's essentially the estimated payroll for the

classification of employees under those particular employers.

So you'll find that, you know, compared to the size of Delphi

Corporation, you're talking about deminimus payroll. And when

you calculate out the premium you'll find on the next page on

Page 51 349, ACE policy 349, you'll go down and unfortunately in very small print, it says, "total estimated annual premium \$316." That's on sort of the right-hand column about 80 percent down the page. THE COURT: Okay. So can we go back to the general section, the general terms? MR. OLSHIN: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Okay. So A and B both say essentially the same thing. A says, it is -- this policy, it is a contract of insurance between you (the employer named in item 1 of the information page) and us, the insurer named on the information page). Then B says, "you are insured if you are the employer named in item 1 of the information page." I guess to be more complete, E says, "this policy covers all of your work places listed on 1 or 4 of the information page, and it covers all other work places in item 3A," and states, "unless you have other insurance or are a self-insured for such work places." But I want to focus on A and B where it says that "this is a contract of insurance between you and the employer named in item 1 of the information page." MR. OLSHIN: Uh-huh. THE COURT: So if Bates 000348 is the Michigan information page, why doesn't item 1 mean that Delphi

Automotive System Corporation is the insured?

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MR. OLSHIN: Because they're the named insured on this multi-state policy.

THE COURT: On everything?

MR. OLSHIN: Correct. But as item A says in the first sentence, the policy includes, at its effective date, "the information page and all the endorsements and schedules listed therein, or listed there," I'm sorry.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. OLSHIN: So I think read in the total context, what the policy is saying is, and I agree, this is a policy which I guess one could at least say, is complex. So as you work through the pages, and look at them all in context, we think you come out in the place where you're going to the information page. Because if you look at the Michigan law endorsement, which is 353, it says at the top, "this endorsement applies only to the insurance provided by this policy," so it's talking about what's provided, because Michigan is shown in item 3A of the information page.

Now, in this particular policy, when you go to the first page, which is the information page, Michigan doesn't appear. What it tells you to do is to go to the individual state information page, which is the document that Your Honor and I were discussing at 348.

THE COURT: So if you go back to the first page of the policy --

MR. OLSHIN: Right.

THE COURT: -- which is 000254, 3A does say part 1 of the policy applies to the worker's compensation law of the states listed here, and that sends you to the information page. So I guess I understand the argument, which is that it's what's listed in 3A. Part 1 is what's really listed in 3A.

MR. OLSHIN: Right. And in this particular policy, there is an added endorsement which is the very last page of the section 404, which reads, "The following," and it has a number of boxes, and the first item says, "insured's name."

And if you go down to the end it says, "is changed to read" and it basically provides the names Packard Hughes and Delphi Diesel.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. OLSHIN: And so all those documents read in combination we believe are conclusive of the fact that this 2000 policy was only rated for and only applies to Packard Hughes and Delphi Diesel.

THE COURT: And you're turning to the Michigan law endorsement?

MR. OLSHIN: Yes, sir.

THE COURT: You say that that doesn't expand the coverage because by its terms it applies only to the insurance provided by the policy.

MR. OLSHIN: Correct. And we believe that the

Page 54 insurance provided by this policy is consistent with 621(2) as the policy terms and conditions were approved by the Michigan Insurance Department. THE COURT: So you say that the -- obviously at the top of that endorsement, it says the named insured is Delphi Automotive System Corporation. MR. OLSHIN: Correct. THE COURT: But you're saying that's not the employer? MR. OLSHIN: We're saying that's a self-insured employer. THE COURT: But the terms of the endorsement all refer to you as the insured employer, and you're saying well, it's not insured by the policy. The only ones that are insured by the policy are --MR. OLSHIN: On the information page. THE COURT: -- the Hughes and --MR. OLSHIN: The Michigan information page. THE COURT: Right. MR. OLSHIN: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Which would be Delphi Diesel Systems and --MR. OLSHIN: I think in this policy it's -- yes, it's Packard Hughes Engineering Service and Delphi Diesel System. THE COURT: Okay. All right. I want to hear you after we're done with all of these, but I think I -- in looking

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Page 55 1 at these, the 2000 policy seems to fit your argument the best; 2 maybe that's why it came first. But why don't we turn then to 3 2001. 4 MR. OLSHIN: Yes, sir. THE COURT: Okay. 5 6 MR. OLSHIN: It's basically set up --7 THE COURT: And again, this is a reference to -- it 8 has again the cross-reference in 3A on the first page, which is 000741, it says "Part 1 of the policy applies to the worker's 9 10 compensation law of the states listed here: per information 11 page attached." 12 MR. OLSHIN: Correct. 13 THE COURT: And you're saying that --14 MR. OLSHIN: That gets you to page 830. 15 THE COURT: Right, 00830, 000830, which references the 16 State of Michigan. 17 MR. OLSHIN: Correct, yes, Your Honor. And on that 18 document, you'll find -- in this particular case, in the 2001 19 year, the policy Michigan information page is actually pages 830 and 831, so it's actually two pages. But it's set up 20 21 basically the same way in terms of, in this case, indicating 22 that the only entity that's insured is Allied Signal 23 Environmental Catalyst, and with respect to this policy, the 24 premium is then calculated and you find it in the same place on 25 831, the estimated premium is \$14.

Page 56 THE COURT: Okay. Now, this one is different than the 2011 -- I'm sorry, the 2000 exhibit because it doesn't contain the policy page endorsement; is that right? MR. OLSHIN: Well, we think it's --THE COURT: Policy provision page endorsement. MR. OLSHIN: Well, we think it's slightly different because it doesn't have that, and on this particular information page, unlike the others that come later on in the years, Delphi Automotive Systems appears on the Michigan information page. So what we did for Your Honor was to provide --THE COURT: Well, I'm sorry. It appears in item 1. MR. OLSHIN: It appears in item 1 on the Michigan information page. THE COURT: But that's the -- it also appears on -- in the 2000 Michigan information page on item 1. MR. OLSHIN: Correct. And I guess what I was pointing out is it doesn't appear in the later years --THE COURT: Okay. MR. OLSHIN: -- of the Michigan information page. we think the policy terms written as a whole work the same way because you're going from the Michigan law endorsement, which is 837, and you're basically referred back --

MR. HADDAD: It's 835.

THE COURT: Sorry?

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Page 57 1 MR. HADDAD: It's 835, not 837. 2 THE COURT: Right. 3 MR. OLSHIN: Oh, I'm sorry, Richard, I misspoke. 4 Thank you. Where it says in the first line, "this endorsement applies only to the insurance provided by the policy holder" 5 6 because Michigan is shown in item 3A of the information page. 7 THE COURT: Well, it doesn't say policy holder, it 8 says by the policy. 9 MR. OLSHIN: By the policy. 10 THE COURT: So you're saying that the policy only 11 applies to the 3A listed entities in the Michigan information 12 page. 13 MR. OLSHIN: Right. And in this case, this policy 14 information page is the same as in 2000 Michigan isn't listed. 15 It refers you back to the page 830, which is the Michigan 16 information page. 17 THE COURT: All right. Well, it doesn't specifically. 18 I'm sorry, are we still on the Michigan endorsement? 19 MR. OLSHIN: I'm sorry? 20 THE COURT: What refers you back? 21 MR. OLSHIN: Maybe I --22 THE COURT: The Michigan endorsement doesn't refer you 23 back. 24 MR. OLSHIN: Maybe I missed your question, Your Honor. 25 THE COURT: Okay. Well, you said something refers you

Page 58 1 back. 2 MR. OLSHIN: Yeah, the Michigan law endorsement says 3 "this endorsement applies only to the insurance provided by the 4 policy --" THE COURT: Oh, in 3A. 5 6 MR. OLSHIN: -- because Michigan is shown in item 3A 7 of the information page. 8 THE COURT: Right. 9 MR. OLSHIN: And when you go to the information page on this particular policy, Michigan isn't listed. What it does 10 11 say, "per information page attached." So that's how you know 12 you've got to go to page 830, which in fact, is the Michigan 13 information page. MR. HADDAD: I'm sorry, I missed that, where did it 14 15 say per the -- in item 3A, where does it say per information 16 page attached? 17 MR. OLSHIN: If you look at the --18 THE COURT: On the first page 000741, it says "per 19 information page attached." 20 MR. HADDAD: Right. 21 THE COURT: And then you go to 000830. 22 MR. OLSHIN: Right. 23 THE COURT: Which is 3A. 24 MR. OLSHIN: And you know that's Michigan on 830 25 because the word Michigan appears under item 3.

Page 59 THE COURT: Okay. So let's turn then to 2008, which I 1 2 think is -- I won't say anything. Let's go to 2008 then. 3 MR. OLSHIN: That's under tab 15 of the reply 4 exhibits. THE COURT: Right. 5 MR. OLSHIN: The first page of which is 2475. And the 6 7 policy is essentially set up the same way, although the front page looks a little different from the prior years. 9 THE COURT: Well, the front page doesn't send you to 10 an information page. 11 MR. OLSHIN: Well, what it says is, part 1 of the 12 policy -- I'm looking at 3A, applies to the worker's compensation law of the states listed here. 13 14 THE COURT: Right. MR. OLSHIN: And the states are listed. And then item 15 16 4 says, "the premium for this policy will be determined by the 17 manual of rules classification rates and rating plans, all 18 information required below is subject to verification and 19 change by audit. See extension of information page 20 classifications." 21 So you then go to something called the extension of 22 information page classifications --23 THE COURT: We can stop, though, for a second? 24 MR. OLSHIN: Yes, sir. 25 THE COURT: If we go again to the -- what I find to be

different here, although, in 2000 and 2001, first page, it says
"Part 1 of the policy applies to the worker's compensation law
of the states listed here, per information page attached." So
it says part 1, see the information page. And that's what
governs.

This one, item 1 says, Delphi Corporation is the insured, and then it says for other named insured, see extension of information page. So at least the implication to me of that is that they're both named insured, they're both the insured. And then item 3A just refers you to the fact that part 1 of the policy applies to the worker's compensation law of the states listed here, including Michigan.

So it's not as clear to me that the same construct applies, that you then go to the extension of information page and that's what governs. But even if you do go to the extension of information page, Delphi Corporation, a lot of Michigan entities are on it. So I --

MR. OLSHIN: I want to make sure Your Honor and I are looking at the same page.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. OLSHIN: I'm looking at Bates number 2647, extension of information page, classifications, Michigan.

MR. HADDAD: I was looking at 2516.

THE COURT: Well, I mean, there are a lot of other pages that list --

Page 61 1 MR. OLSHIN: And we'll talk about the other pages, I 2 just want to make sure Your Honor and I are looking at the same 3 page, so that I can answer your question. 4 THE COURT: Well, okay. As long as you go back also 5 to --6 MR. OLSHIN: I'd be happy to. 7 THE COURT: -- 2156 and 2519 and --8 MR. OLSHIN: Sure. THE COURT: -- 2520, 2521. But which is the one you 9 want to focus on? 10 11 MR. OLSHIN: Well, I'll focus on those first if Your 12 Honor --13 THE COURT: Okay. 14 MR. OLSHIN: -- prefers I do that. 15 THE COURT: All right. So --16 MR. OLSHIN: I think what happens under this policy is 17 that this is a multi-state policy it's covering Delphi 18 operations in, if I counted the number of states correctly, at 19 one point, I think the number's like 32. 20 THE COURT: Right. 21 MR. OLSHIN: So it's not surprising that, in fact, 22 those other entities would be named because they are picked up 23 in various states depending upon where those entities operated. 24 THE COURT: But these are Michigan entities. 25 MR. OLSHIN: Some of them are, some of them aren't.

Page 62 1 THE COURT: So are you saying this only covers their 2 liabilities if someone who works at the Michigan, let's just 3 you know pick one, Glen Hill workplace gets injured in 4 California? MR. OLSHIN: No, that's not what I'm saying. 5 6 THE COURT: Okay. So --7 MR. OLSHIN: I thought you were referring to the list 8 in general, and what I said was, some of them are Michigan and 9 some of them are not. 10 THE COURT: Right. 11 MR. OLSHIN: And to determine which workplaces are 12 covered under this endorsement, you look first to the general 13 section, which indicates that self-insured entities aren't 14 covered, and you look at the designated workplace exclusion 15 endorsement, which is ACE policy 2794, it's the last page --16 THE COURT: Well, we'll get to the exclusion 17 endorsement --18 MR. OLSHIN: All right. 19 THE COURT: -- but I want to unpack what you just said 20 a little bit. 21 How -- from page 1 --22 MR. OLSHIN: Yes. 23 THE COURT: -- how do you -- what supports the statement that self-insured entities aren't covered? 24 25 MR. OLSHIN: I think the general locations section of

Page 63 1 the general section of the policy. 2 THE COURT: Well, let's just take --3 MR. OLSHIN: And the designated workplace exclusion 4 endorsement together. THE COURT: Okay. But leaving aside the exclusion 5 6 endorsement on 2475, what on this page shows that self-insured 7 entities are not covered? MR. OLSHIN: On this particular page, 2475 in and of itself? 9 10 THE COURT: Right. 11 MR. OLSHIN: There's nothing other than the fact that 12 the policy says on the first page, "see schedules and forms and 13 endorsements" which is about three-quarters of the way --14 THE COURT: Okay. 15 MR. OLSHIN: -- and item 4 of the policy. 16 THE COURT: All right. So when you -- so again when you go to the general section, it has the same language that I 17 18 quoted earlier: "You, the employer named in item 1 in the 19 information page." 20 MR. OLSHIN: Right. 21 THE COURT: But here, is there a -- I mean, there are 22 a lot of information pages. 23 MR. OLSHIN: No doubt, I agree. 24 THE COURT: And many of them list -- well, one of them 25 lists Delphi Corporation, one of them lists Delphi Automotive

Page 64 1 Systems, Services, and then some other Delphi entities. 2 MR. OLSHIN: Right. 3 THE COURT: And then there's specific locations listed 4 in Michigan. MR. OLSHIN: Yes, sir. 5 THE COURT: So unlike 2000 and 2001, is there a 6 7 specific Michigan information page? 8 MR. OLSHIN: Yes, sir. THE COURT: And you'd say that's 2647? 9 10 MR. OLSHIN: Give me one second to find it here. 11 It is 2647, that is correct. 12 THE COURT: Okay. But why would these -- why would 13 you have these other pages covering Michigan entities and 14 locations, and then separately have a Michigan information 15 page? 16 MR. OLSHIN: Well, you would have a separate Michigan 17 information page to reflect which entities are actually being 18 rated under this policy. 19 THE COURT: But --20 MR. OLSHIN: You would have the list. Is there a 21 better way to prepare the list? Maybe there could've been, but in this case, the list was the entities which ACE/Pacific had 22 23 listed as potential Delphi entities, but you have to look at 24 the general section of the policy and the designated workplace 25 exclusion endorsement because to the extent --

1 THE COURT: I know I'm putting you off on the 2 exclusion endorsement --3 MR. OLSHIN: Right. THE COURT: -- but so just turning back again to 02519 through 02521, they list a lot of Michigan locations. So what 5 is the purpose of this list, which is also an extension of 6 7 information page? 8 MR. OLSHIN: I think read in context of this policy, it's reflecting if something turns out not to be self-insured 9 10 because it's covered. If it's self-insured, it's not covered. 11 THE COURT: And you get there through the exclusion? 12 MR. OLSHIN: I get there through the exclusion and the 13 general section of the policy. Because the exclusion says, 14 "locations covered by the following policies are not covered under this deductible policy," and in the State of Michigan, as 15 16 part of its self-insured approval process, Delphi provided a 17 list to the Agency and Funds, which specified exactly those 18 Delphi operations for which it required or requested self-19 insurer authority to be approved. And those were the entities 20 that were approved and locations. 21 THE COURT: And this is 0002498? 22 MR. OLSHIN: 00 -- you mean, the designated workplace 23 exclusion endorsement, Your Honor? 24 THE COURT: Yes. 25 MR. OLSHIN: 002794.

Page 66 1 THE COURT: Well, wait a minute. 2 MR. OLSHIN: The first page of which is 002793 which 3 basically says --4 THE COURT: I'm sorry, let me get to that. I don't think I have that in my exhibit book. 5 MR. OLSHIN: You don't? 6 7 THE COURT: Oh, I'm sorry, I have it. MR. OLSHIN: It should be the very last page at tab 15. 9 THE COURT: 94, okay. Oh, there's two of them here I 10 11 quess. There's another one: 002498, designated workplaces 12 excluding endorsement. Do you see that one, too? 13 UNIDENTIFIED: (Indiscernible) MR. OLSHIN: I'm sorry, what? 14 15 UNIDENTIFIED: The page right before (indiscernible). 16 THE COURT: Do you see that? It's right after the 17 general terms. 18 MR. OLSHIN: You're correct, Your Honor, it was 19 actually in two places. I was looking in the other place. 20 THE COURT: Is it the same thing? 21 MR. OLSHIN: I think it is. THE COURT: Yeah, it looks like it is. So --22 23 MR. OLSHIN: Yeah, it is, Your Honor. 24 THE COURT: -- you're representing to me that these --25 MR. OLSHIN: 2498 and 2794 appear to be the same.

Page 67 1 THE COURT: So when you -- so this says, "The policy 2 does not cover work conducted at or from," and then it lists 3 three policies. Right? Is that what WCU, WCU and SCF means? 4 MR. OLSHIN: Right, there's four, right. 5 THE COURT: Four, excuse me. 6 MR. OLSHIN: And one of them is the retention policy 7 that was issued for 2008 and 2009. 8 THE COURT: And that's the SCF-1 I guess. 9 MR. OLSHIN: I can tell you in two seconds. 10 It's the 135, Your Honor, the last three digits, the 11 third one down. 12 THE COURT: So --13 MR. OLSHIN: Some of these others apply to other 14 states. 15 THE COURT: So what is the import of listing these 16 four policies? 17 MR. OLSHIN: It's telling the policy holder and the 18 reader that if you have self-insured locations, which is what 19 is covered under a self-insured retention policy, that those 20 locations are not covered under the deductible policy. 21 THE COURT: But how do you get that from just the listing of these four policies? 22 23 MR. OLSHIN: Because you know from those policies that 24 Delphi Corporation self-insured locations in Michigan are in 25 fact covered, and that's in the cover page of the self-insured

Page 68 1 retention policy. 2 THE COURT: I'm sorry, so let's just go -- which is 3 the one from Michigan of these four? 4 MR. OLSHIN: The third one down, 0135. THE COURT: Okay. So 0135 says what? 5 6 MR. OLSHIN: It's the self-insured retention policy 7 for that policy year, which covers Delphi's self-insured 8 operations for that policy. It's under -- it looks like it's 9 tab 16, Bates number ACE policy 224. It's entitled "specific 10 excess worker's compensation --" 11 THE COURT: So this covers, this covers -- tab 16, 12 that policy covers all of the self-insured locations, it's an 13 excess policy. 14 MR. OLSHIN: Yes, sir. And you know that under item 3 15 on page 224, states in which coverages apply, and one of the 16 states indicated is Michigan. 17 THE COURT: Okay. So --18 MR. OLSHIN: And an example of what I was talking 19 about earlier, Your Honor, with respect to the self-insured 20 application is the one that's under tab 18 --21 THE COURT: Right. MR. OLSHIN: -- which reflects at Bates number 22 23 MIWCAFOIA003774, the list of Michigan operations. 24 THE COURT: So what you're saying is, notwithstanding 25 the references on page 1 of the policy, 002475, to the -- those

Page 69 named on the extension of information schedules, the reference 1 2 to this policy includes these forms -- or these endorsements 3 and schedules - "see schedules and forms of endorsements" --4 that that includes the exclusion? 5 MR. OLSHIN: Correct. 6 THE COURT: Which modifies the general section? 7 MR. OLSHIN: Well, works in combination with I guess 8 is what I would say. 9 THE COURT: And so the policy doesn't really cover --10 MR. OLSHIN: Right. THE COURT: -- these locations. 11 12 MR. OLSHIN: And the similar construct of this 2008 13 policy works for --THE COURT: 2003, 2005 and 2006. 14 15 MR. OLSHIN: Yes, sir. 16 THE COURT: Okay. So should we turn to 2007? 17 MR. OLSHIN: Well --18 THE COURT: I'm not sure there's any difference with 2007 either. 19 20 MR. OLSHIN: 2007 works the same way. 21 THE COURT: Okay. And 2004? MR. OLSHIN: The difference in 2004 is those Michigan 22 extension of information pages that we've spent a lot of time 23 24 talking about. 25 THE COURT: Right.

MR. OLSHIN: As well as any other information page in that particular policy. For some reason, a computer decided to insert in every single information page, instead of the actual name of the entity, it used the word "insured", i-n-s-u-r-e-d. So if you would look at, and I've provided an example of one which was Alabama, and I'm looking under tab 37, Your Honor. THE COURT: Right. MR. OLSHIN: It's ACE policy 1191. THE COURT: And what page? MR. OLSHIN: I'm sorry? THE COURT: And what page? MR. OLSHIN: It's ACE policy 001191, it's the --THE COURT: No, I know, but you were going to go to a specific page in the --MR. OLSHIN: Oh, I apologize. I'm sorry. THE COURT: That's okay. MR. OLSHIN: I've yet -- instead of giving you the whole policy, I just wanted to make the point that they also have the same. So if you look for instance at ACE policy 001242, that is the worker's compensation and employer's liability insurance policy information page for Alabama, instead of indicating the entity, it just says insured, and correspondingly if you look over at 1302, again for whatever reason, the computer just stuck in the word insured for however many states this policy is covering. I think it's still

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covering close to 30 some odd states. That's what all the information pages provide for.

THE COURT: But again, I think given that there are information pages that list Michigan addresses, you're really relying on the exclusion again, aren't you?

MR. OLSHIN: Well, I'm relying on the exclusion, and I provided Your Honor under tab 38, Aon Delphi's submission, which shows you, and that's the whole submission is Bates number 1761 through 1768, this is the worker's compensation submission. And if you look at within tab 38, Reply Exhibit 38, 1766, you'll find that Delphi and Aon went to a lot of trouble splitting out its insured obligations from it's self-insured obligations.

THE COURT: But in the policy itself, is there an exclusion?

MR. OLSHIN: In the -- yes, there is an exclusion.

THE COURT: And where is that? I'm trying to find it here.

MR. OLSHIN: I've got to find it for you.

THE COURT: I thought I went through all these, but I haven't gone through this one. Oh, I see, it's 001212.

MR. OLSHIN: 1212, that's correct.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. OLSHIN: It says, "The designated workplace exclusion endorsement, this policy does not cover work

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conducted at or from," and then it says, "this policy does not cover work conducted at or from any workplace covered by the following policies," and it gives two policy numbers. And the retention policy for 2004, 2005 is the -- is included in the reply exhibits.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

MR. OLSHIN: So we provided the Aon Delphi submission to show Your Honor that when you look at the words "insured," you can look at under Reply Exhibit 38, ACE 1766, which is part of that submission, and if you go to Michigan you'll see that there are two entities, ASEC, spelled A-S-E-C and Mechatronics, M-e-c-h-a-t-r-o-n-i-c-s, and it provides for the Michigan operations for ASEC, 877,742, and for Mechatronics, 1,294,164, and if you look at the Michigan extension of information page, and the rating you basically can track those numbers.

So we think the words "insured" are meant fairly to represent those two entities.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. So what is the Michigan

-- does anyone want to take a break? I was going to ask the

Michigan defendants whether they -- you know, would want to

respond to this, but I'm happy to take a five minute break or

so.

MR. HADDAD: Whatever Your Honor's pleasure is, because I'm going to have a significant amount to say with respect to each of these points.

Page 73 1 THE COURT: All right. Why don't we come back --2 MR. HADDAD: But I'm happy to proceed. 3 THE COURT: -- around noon. 4 (Recessed at 11:55 a.m.; reconvened at 12:06 p.m.) THE CLERK: All rise. 5 THE COURT: Be seated. 6 7 Okay. We're back on the record in ACE America 8 Insurance Company and Pacific Employers Insurance Company 9 versus Delphi et al. 10 MR. HADDAD: Thank you, Your Honor. I have spoken a 11 little bit to the legal statutory issues, and I indicated at 12 that time that there's a combination of the statute and the 13 contract here which is being presented to Your Honor for 14 decision. And what have here, Your Honor, is a unique scenario 15 of the insurance company trying to get out of paying by arguing 16 that the plain meaning of the words of its own policy should 17 not be interpreted as written. 18 Now, usually my experience has been with insurance 19 companies over the years is they try and catch with you with 20 some kind of hidden cottage deal, or ah, you don't win because 21 of the such and such endorsement. And they're trying that 22 here. They're saying you don't win because of one of these 23 exclusions that we just pointed to. 24 But here, and here is where they lose, as a matter of

law, as a matter of fact, as a matter of contractual

interpretation, the reason why they lose and why the Michigan defendants are entitled to summary judgment is because each policy contains the Michigan law endorsement.

And that Michigan law endorsement is admittedly unambiguous, is attached to each policy. The only links into is Section 3A, which is the name of the state to which it applies. So all the references to Section 4, to item 4, to premium calculations, to anything else, they don't apply.

And what the Michigan law endorsement says, it's got an override clause, and it's got a nullified clause. And the override clause says, "notwithstanding any language elsewhere contained in this contract or policy of insurance, the accident fund or insurer issuing this policy hereby contracts and agrees," and then they list the claims -- the coverage, and they say we're providing compensation, and are providing medical services, and we're providing rehabilitation services, and we're providing funeral services. And we're looking at the conflict provision at the end, the nullified clause, clause H, and it's attached in every single one of these policies.

It says, "Any provision of this contract which is not in harmony with this paragraph, is to be construed as modified hereby, and all conditions and limitations in this policy," all conditions and limitations in this policy, "if any, conflicting herewith, are hereby made null and void." That's a requirement of law and it's in every one of their contracts.

THE COURT: What abut the introductory clause to the whole thing?

MR. HADDAD: Yep.

THE COURT: Which says, "This endorsement applies only to the insurance provided by the policy."

MR. HADDAD: Right. Because Michigan is shown in item 3A, the reason why it is, is because Michigan is shown in 3A, and that's what links it to Michigan, otherwise, the Michigan law endorsement would not apply, you'd have the Alabama endorsement, or the Washington endorsement, or some other endorsement.

What we're saying here is, since you have Michigan in item 3A, then this endorsement applies. The named insured is Delphi. You are the insured employer, and then it says "notwithstanding any language elsewhere contained in this contract." And that's a very important clause. The "notwithstanding any language elsewhere contained in this policy," because that language is routinely enforced, and in our reply brief, in our moving brief, we've cited cases including from the Michigan Supreme Court which say, when there's a "notwithstanding" paragraph in your contract, it's unambiguous. Because even if you have something completely to the contrary somewhere else in that policy, it is not to be enforced as a matter of law. And you must, you must enforce the contract as written in the Michigan law endorsement.

Now, at Mr. Schrock's (ph) deposition and one of the other side submitted the entirety of Mr. Schrock's deposition, he gave a deposition a couple of weeks ago, they asked him "Do you have a copy of the policy" because he was saying we were having all these multiple assureds, he said, no, I don't have the policy. They said, well then how do you know what's in the policy. He says, well, and it's at Mr. Schrock's transcript at page 35 and 36, he said, well, the terms of the policy are governed by statute and these terms contained in this Michigan law endorsement are verbatim out of 621 of the statute, verbatim. And it provides a minimum level of coverage that is set forth by any insurer that writes a policy in Michigan.

When ACE decided, when ACE decided that they were going to do business in Michigan, they -- when they signed up to say, I'm going to be a worker's compensation insurer in Michigan, they agreed to include this clause in every one of their contracts. In fact, they were compelled to. They were compelled to by statute, and beyond that, they in fact did. They in fact did include this clause, this Michigan law endorsement in each and every one of their contracts.

And I was deposing Mr. Groves (ph) of ACE. He hadn't supplied an affidavit on the motion; I had actually wanted to depose the person who supplied the affidavit, they said that person's not available, we'll get you Mr. Groves. I said, okay, we'll depose Mr. Groves, he's a senior guy at ACE, he

knows a lot. And he explained a number of things that are very, very critical. And we've cited to them in our moving papers, attach it to my affidavit, and summarized it in our moving memo of law.

He said, well, when we decided to go into Michigan, we said we intend to comply with Michigan law, page 45, 44, 45.

He said, we included the required Michigan endorsement in every policy. And I walked him through a policy. And when I walked Mr. Groves through it at his deposition was the 2008 policy, and I asked him was the -- how was this policy prepared. And he said, well, we have an underwriter and an assistant underwriter, and they prepare instructions, and they give it to ACE's central operations unit in Wilmington, Delaware and is prepared by somebody there, and then they have a supervisor, and a quality control process to ensure that the policies are prepared in accordance with its intention, pages 30, 31 through 38 of Mr. Groves' deposition.

And he said then the policy is reviewed to coincide with the issuance instructions from the underwriter, then it's reviewed by the underwriter to make sure it's accurate. And then it's signed by yet another person who signs the policy, and then they go ahead and file a Form 400 with the State of Michigan.

Now, Your Honor's not asked to decide what is the legal effect of the filing of the Form 400 with the State of

1 Michigan. But what is indisputably a fact is that Michigan --2 is that ACE, in fact, filed Form 400 with the State of Michigan 3 saying, we've issued policies to Delphi Corporation or its predecessor Delphi Automotive Systems Company. And that's in the record on this motion. 5 So, in fact, all these people prepared this policy and 7 included this. And Mr. Groves testified, well, our intention was to comply with Michigan law. And I asked him, well, who's the named insured. He said, well, it's Delphi, page 50 of Mr. 9 Groves' testimony. And it has Delphi's federal employer 10 insurance number. And the schedule of the named insureds 11 12 includes Delphi. 13 And, in fact, if they wanted to delete somebody and if 14 you're looking at the 2008 policy, it's attached -- the 15 excerpts are attached as Exhibit A to Mr. Elsenheimer's 16 declaration. Page 2156, name insured Delphi. 17 THE COURT: But it is a named insured. 18 MR. HADDAD: What's that? 19 THE COURT: It is a named insured. 20 MR. HADDAD: It is a named insured, exactly right. 21 THE COURT: But --22 MR. HADDAD: They're trying to get out of that and 23 that's what Your Honor --24 THE COURT: Well, it's a named insured for, they say, 25 everything that's not excluded.

MR. HADDAD: No, but that's not what the policy says. The policy doesn't say that precisely because, precisely because the Michigan law endorsement says you only reference 3A to find out the State of Michigan is implicated. And after that, it says, you are the insured employer, Delphi Corporation, and, notwithstanding any language anywhere else in this contract, we are making the following insurance. And if there's anything, all provisions of this contract, it's paragraph H. Paragraph H of the Michigan law endorsement to nullify clause that says all provisions of this contract which are not in harmony with this paragraph, all provisions of the contract which are not in harmony with the Michigan law endorsement, are to be construed to be modified hereby. And --THE COURT: Well, I guess my question is, why isn't the Michigan law endorsement in harmony with the insurer's position here? MR. HADDAD: Because they are saying that you look to premium calculation or claims or --THE COURT: No, no, leave that aside. MR. HADDAD: -- ratings or exclusions. THE COURT: Leave that aside. They are saying that the only insurance provided here is to the specific employer either, under the 2000 and 2001 policies, listed on the information sheet, or the non-excluded employer. MR. HADDAD: Because the policy says named insured

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Delphi Corporation, you are the insured employer. And when I asked Mr. Groves, I said, is this ambiguous, he said no. I said --

THE COURT: He didn't say what it means though. He just said it's not ambiguous.

MR. HADDAD: No, actually he did say what it means, because I go to that. First -- and then Mr. Olshin interrupted and said, well, the document speaks for itself, well, I do agree, I do agree, the document speaks for itself, that's why you must not consider those other provisions upon which he relies.

But I think asked --

THE COURT: No, you're right it does. He says at line

16 that the insured employer is Delphi Corporation.

MR. HADDAD: And on page 70 of my deposition of Mr. Groves, I asked him, does this policy cover worker's compensation liability for Delphi Corporation. He said yes.

And I said, well, it's time for lunch because I think
I'm done. He said yes, and then we gave him that transcript to
sign, and he reviewed that transcript, and he signed it, and he
didn't change that, after they knew what our position was on
this motion, mind you, which I think is very significant. And
now in reply, after having not only so testified, after not
only having reviewed, signed, and returned his transcript
making other corrections, but not correcting this, he says,

well, I want to change something on page 66.

Well, let's suppose he's allowed to change something on page 66 -- and I don't believe he is, because as a matter of law, once you've signed your transcript, that's it, you're bound to that testimony. He's the officer of ACE Insurance Company. But he didn't say I want to change paragraphs -- I don't want to change page 70. He didn't run from his testimony at page 70, that the policy covers worker's compensation liability for Delphi Corporation, and the reason for that is it plain does. It plainly does on the face of the document. And when you're asked to interpret a contract, when parties present to the Court the contract for interpretation, you look to several things.

Now, here you look to the law, as well as the contract itself. And let me tell you why you look to the law first.

Worker's compensation and Mr. Elsenheimer's affidavit talks about this, our moving papers talk about this, worker's compensation is a unique kind of insurance. It's not like D&O insurance, it's not like lawyer's malpractice insurance, it is insurance the terms of which are dictated by statute. It is designed to achieve a public policy purpose, it is required for all employers having three or more employees in the State of Michigan, and it is a very critical public policy objective of the State, when they introduced and entered this legislation, that the law of the State of Michigan was very important, it's

designed to protect the employee and designed to protect the employer, to say these are the benefits to which you are employed and injured.

And in interpreting a contract for worker's compensation insurance, and we cited to the Moss case versus -New Amsterdam versus Moss, we cited that case, and they say, in view of the unique nature of worker's compensation insurance, we don't look to issues of meetings of the mind, or intent. We apply the insurance as required by law, as required by law.

And, in fact, they said we don't even care about the premiums. There was a debate in that case in the Moss versus the New Amsterdam case, there was a debate about well, who paid the premiums and what premiums were being paid. The Court said the premiums don't matter, it's a matter between them, between ACE and Delphi. It's not a matter with respect to the state or the injured employees, that is not an issue of concern to us.

That was a number of years ago. But more recently, this year, the Michigan Supreme Court again spoke to a type of insurance, in the Titan case, and we referenced it in our reply brief.

In the Titan case, there was a car insurance, so it's not worker's compensation, but the State of Michigan had mandated 20/40 minimum coverage, and the person committed some kind of misrepresentation of fraud in getting 100/300 policy.

The Court said, well, with respect to that which policy is

mandated by the terms of the statute, which affected that policy, in other words, any car insurance policy that an insurance company issues in the State of Michigan, it's got to be 20/40, so you can't get out of that. But as to this other stuff, you can go have it on terms of fraud or equitable remedies.

Here, each policy, that's why I said the contract is linked into the law, here our statute says that each policy for worker's compensation has to provide these very terms. And, in fact, this policy does, these policies do, each and every one of these policies do. Each and every one of these policies says Delphi Corporation or its predecessor Delphi Automotive in the Michigan law endorsement.

There's no qualification, there's no limitation. In fact, it's got the antithesis of qualification or limitation.

And he said -- Mr. Olshin was arguing and pointing to premiums and classifications and none of that matters. Because you have an unambiguous term here, an unambiguous Michigan law endorsement which prohibits us from looking outside this endorsement in interpreting it. Prohibits it.

They then say and I heard Mr. Olshin argue again this morning, well, look at this, the broker did some kind of calculation.

THE COURT: No, leave that aside. I just -- again, I want to come back to what the Michigan law endorsement says.

Page 84 1 First, it says, "This endorsement applies only to the insurance 2 provided by the policy, because Michigan is shown in item 3A of 3 the information page." 4 MR. HADDAD: Right. 5 THE COURT: Now, you contend I guess that "only" modifies "because." 6 7 MR. HADDAD: Yeah, because you have a --8 THE COURT: As opposed to the word right in front of it which is "the insurance." 9 10 MR. HADDAD: Well, it provides -- applies only to the 11 insurance provided by the policy because Michigan -- so you 12 have this giant policy, Your Honor, it has -- I don't think you 13 have the policy --14 THE COURT: Yeah. People have misused this often, but usually "only" modifies what it's in front of as opposed to 15 16 something down the line. But leave that aside --17 MR. HADDAD: Putting that aside, it can still --18 THE COURT: -- I can see it be read both ways on that 19 point. 20 MR. HADDAD: I still come back to, I still come right 21 back to, you are the insured employer. 22 THE COURT: Right. 23 MR. HADDAD: You are the insured employer, Delphi 24 Corporation. And now we cannot look beyond the scope --25 THE COURT: But the question is --

Page 85 1 MR. HADDAD: -- of this. 2 THE COURT: -- who is "you." 3 MR. HADDAD: You, you right there, you are the insured 4 employer. Look at the top, named insured, Delphi Corporation. Mr. Groves testified Delphi Corporation. 5 THE COURT: But the policy doesn't say that. The 6 7 policy doesn't say that Delphi Corporation is the insured 8 employer. 9 MR. HADDAD: Right. The policy certainly lists -- I 10 don't know how you can get around named insured --11 THE COURT: It says it is an insured employer for 12 certain specific locations. 13 MR. HADDAD: Well, I don't know why they listed every 14 one of the Delphi --THE COURT: Well, if you take your exclusion, if you 15 16 accept the exclusion. 17 MR. HADDAD: I mean that's kind of silly to say let's 18 take inclusions and exclusions. 19 THE COURT: All right. But --20 MR. HADDAD: Given the unambiguous language of this 21 document --22 THE COURT: Well --23 MR. HADDAD: -- which is how they've acknowledged it 24 to be. I mean, that's the testimony, and I think that's what 25 it is on its face.

2 Entered 11/09/12 11:32:07 Main Document 86 of 161 Page 86 1 THE COURT: The language says that, and the statutory 2 language is what's under the headings --3 MR. HADDAD: Notwithstanding. 4 THE COURT: -- that "it will pay to the persons that may become entitled thereto all workman's compensation for 5 which the insured employer may become liable under the 6 7 provisions of --" 8 MR. HADDAD: It's a little more than that actually. THE COURT: "Under the Michigan's Workman's 9 10 Compensation Act for all compensable injuries or compensable 11 occupation diseases happening to its employees during the life 12 of this contract policy." And then it has several other 13 paragraphs also referring to the "insured employer." 14 So I think the issue for me is, does this endorsement 15 cause -- I'm not asking you to accept that ACE's interpretation 16 is correct, that the insured employer for purposes of these 17 policies is limited by either the exclusionary provision or the -- for 2000, 2001, the information page. But let's assume for 18 19 the moment that the insured employer under the policies is 20 limited by those terms. 21 You're arguing to me that this provision, this 22

endorsement, in essence then, modifies the policy?

MR. HADDAD: I'm saying it is the policy.

THE COURT: It is the policy? Okay.

MR. HADDAD: By their interpretation --

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THE COURT: And you're saying the reason for that is that it's required by Michigan law.

MR. HADDAD: It is required by Michigan law, and it says, "you." So the question doesn't say some other entity that may be covered within the scope of some other policy, it says "you." There's no ambiguity in the word "you."

THE COURT: Well --

MR. HADDAD: You is the only name that --

THE COURT: -- I think there is. I clearly think that you could easily say, in fact, and this is consistent with the policy that this applies to "you," "whoever you are, as the insured employer." Because that's what the policy provides for. "You are the insured employer."

MR. HADDAD: The only name appearing on this document is Delphi Corporation and the only witness that they --

THE COURT: But we are the -- you -- no --

MR. HADDAD: -- set forward to testify about this said it was Delphi Corporation.

THE COURT: But we are the insurer issuing this policy. The policy only applies, again, accepting the hypothetical, the policy only applies to, as far as the Michigan locations are concerned, the ones enumerated. So that's -- we -- it only applies to us, and we are the only insurer under that policy, not for the whole policy.

MR. HADDAD: Your hypothetical with respect is not the

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THE COURT: Let me give you an example. Let's just say that, for example, this policy said that Delphi Corporation is the insured and very clearly covered only one location in Michigan, you know, the clerical office space in Lansing. And then went on to say it applies to Alabama and Arkansas and Alaska and every other state in the union.

Would all of Delphi's locations really be -- would they really be the insured in issuing this policy?

MR. HADDAD: Yes. Because if you look at --

THE COURT: So the Michigan statute is -- where ACE insures workers in Alabama, the Michigan statute's purpose is to incorporate it into Michigan for all workers?

MR. HADDAD: I thought you said Lansing. I'm sorry.

And other -- then I misunderstood Your Honor.

THE COURT: No, there's one location --

MR. HADDAD: I thought you said that it was clericals
-- I misunderstood the context.

THE COURT: It's having a blanket policy --

MR. HADDAD: Yep.

THE COURT: -- and except for one location in Lansing,
Michigan, which is specifically named, and it excludes all
other locations in Michigan, but it issues a blanket policy
which includes the other 49 states in the country, you're
saying that because it issued worker's comp insurance for

Alaska, even though the policy doesn't cover anything in
Michigan other than Lansing, that the fact that it issued that
insurance means that it is, in fact, the insurer under this
policy, and therefore, it has to provide worker's comp for
every location?

MR. HADDAD: In the State of Michigan?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. HADDAD: Not Alaska, and I'll tell you why, I'll tell you that it's because of E, scope of contract. This insurance contract shall for all purposes be held and deemed to cover all the businesses of said -- that the said employer is engaged in at the time of the issuance of this contract, and all other policies that it may engage in during the lifetime.

THE COURT: All right. So let me -- I agree with --

MR. HADDAD: So it's actually yes.

THE COURT: So I agree with you on that point. But let's vary it now.

MR. HADDAD: Okay.

THE COURT: Let's say that it issues a policy that covers Delphi everywhere in the country except Michigan, and it covers Packard Hughes in Michigan. So has it issued insurance for Delphi in Michigan?

MR. HADDAD: I would say the answer is -- given that hypothetical -- what does it say is who the named insured is on the Michigan law endorsement? Because if it says Delphi, then

05-44481-rdd Doc 21986 Filed 11/08/1 HEATER SCORP, ET: 32:07 Main Document Page 90 1 I think the answer is yes. 2 THE COURT: Well, you're saying that the endorsement 3 covers and not the policy? MR. HADDAD: I'm saying that the endorsement covered 5 -- that the endorsement is essentially the policy --6 THE COURT: Even though there's a perfectly good 7 explanation of why it was "the insured," which is that it was 8 the insured in Alabama and Arkansas and Alaska? 9 MR. HADDAD: Well then they wouldn't have listed all of those separate addresses, and they wouldn't have provided 10 11 this document and said, the named insured is Delphi 12 Corporation. They didn't say Packard Hughes. 13 THE COURT: But it's --14 MR. HADDAD: It's not what they said, Your Honor, and they filed a Form 400 with the State of Michigan saying we 15 16 insure Delphi Corporation, to announce to the whole word that 17 that's who's insured. And you can't --18 THE COURT: But that's -- but you can make that 19 argument elsewhere. 20 MR. HADDAD: Well, as a matter of evidence, I think 21 it's an evidence of fact. 22 THE COURT: As a matter of evidence --

MR. HADDAD: I'm not asking you, for you to interpret

that because as a matter of law it's a fact. 24

THE COURT: But I'm just trying -- I'm trying to

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Page 91 1 interpret the endorsement, and it's an endorsement to a 2 specific policy, if the policy doesn't cover the employer, I 3 don't see how it can be an endorsement to the policy. MR. HADDAD: Because the policy as they are now trying to argue is that there is a clause or an exclusion or something 5 else that is inconsistent with the endorsement. 6 7 THE COURT: But why is it inconsistent if the 8 endorsement covers a specific policy? You're -- it seems to me 9 you're putting all the weight on "the named insured," right? 10 MR. HADDAD: I'm putting all the weight on the named 11 insured and who's the insured employer, which it says "you," 12 and you can only mean Delphi, because that's the only people --13 that's the only company that's discussed and it doesn't --14 THE COURT: But it's attached --15 MR. HADDAD: And it doesn't tie --16 THE COURT: But it's attached --17 MR. HADDAD: It's attached to a very large policy. 18 THE COURT: Which refers to other entities. 19 MR. HADDAD: It does, it refers to it, but the reason 20 -- the only thing that we're talking about here is --21 THE COURT: So are the other entities not covered by this? Wouldn't the other entities have to be listed here too 22 23 under your logic?

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THE COURT: Well, they would, obviously, because "you"

MR. HADDAD: I don't know.

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doesn't refer to them under your logic.

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MR. HADDAD: I mean --

THE COURT: The only logical place it refers to is the entities covered by the policy.

MR. HADDAD: Okay. But the entities covered by the policy is modified and clarified unambiguously we submit by this endorsement, because it says anything -- any provision of this contract, and any conditional limitation that conflicts here is made null and void. So the limitation that they're asking for --

THE COURT: Well, that assumes there's a conflict, though. Why would there be a conflict?

MR. HADDAD: Because --

THE COURT: If "you" refers to the policy -- the

person covered by the policy, the employer covered by the

policy, there's no conflict at all. Because Hughes -- Packard

Hughes, this policy does, in fact, cover all of Packard Hughes'

employees, as is the purpose of the statute. So you're not

splitting it up.

MR. HADDAD: This document --

THE COURT: And this isn't, you know, in contrast to the case you cited, this isn't a case where either there's no insurance (because they're self-insured) or, alternatively, someone splitting up the insurance, because that's not happening, either. So the purpose of the endorsement is under

Page 93 1 the ACE interpretation, is completely consistent with their 2 analysis. 3 MR. HADDAD: The purpose -- the ACE interpretation I submit, Your Honor, is completely inconsistent not only with 4 5 the document and with their own witnesses and testimony --6 THE COURT: Well, what is the --7 MR. HADDAD: -- and with their own conduct in issuing 8 the Form 400 and with --9 THE COURT: But what is the purpose --10 MR. HADDAD: -- issuing this policy. 11 THE COURT: What is the purpose of the endorsement? 12 What is the purpose of the statute? 13 MR. HADDAD: To avoid this very dispute, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: Why -- no, why is -- isn't --15 MR. HADDAD: It's to make it --16 THE COURT: Isn't the fact that you're supposed to cover everything, isn't that the purpose of the statute that 17 18 you're supposed to insure all of the employees of the covered 19 employer? 20 MR. HADDAD: Yes. 21 THE COURT: All right. And so --22 MR. HADDAD: And when you say that you're covered --23 and to be clear as to who's your covered employer, you look to your Michigan law endorsement. We don't even get the policy. 24 25 I mean, let's move back a bit.

THE COURT: Where does it say that?

MR. HADDAD: Mr. Schrock so testified and that is undisputed.

THE COURT: That's an issue of law, that's not a -- I
mean --

MR. HADDAD: I mean, it's a fact that we don't get the policy and it's -- it is an undisputed fact that we don't get the policy. They comment about from Mr. Grudy's (ph) reply declaration says that the form was approved, well, sure the form's approved. So long as you've got your endorsement the form's approved. We don't care about exclusions because the exclusions don't apply. Exclusions don't apply to worker's compensation in Michigan. You sign up, you issue the policy --

THE COURT: Exclusions don't apply if you're excluding out part of the employees. But if you're going company-by-company, there's nothing that says they don't apply. I mean, we went through that. You can insure one subsidiary and not another.

MR. HADDAD: Right, and what they --

THE COURT: And that's all the exclusion does, right?

MR. HADDAD: Well, what they chose to do here, and I know I keep coming back to the same place, and the reason why I keep coming back to the same place, is that it's essentially the be all and the end all of the analysis is you are the insured employer, they listed it as Delphi Corporation, their

Page 95 1 witness so testified, it's unambiguous. Anything to the 2 contrary cannot be used to interpret this policy either as a 3 matter of fact, as a matter of law, or as a matter of 4 contractual construction. You can't look to this parole evidence. You can't look there because it's excluded by law. 5 6 Okay. 7 THE COURT: I'm not looking to --8 MR. HADDAD: And I think --THE COURT: I think frankly if I were to look at the 9 10 parole evidence there would be a whole different story, I'm 11 just looking at the agreements. 12 MR. HADDAD: And the agreements has the override 13 clause: "notwithstanding any language elsewhere contained in this contract of policy of insurance." 14 15 THE COURT: Okay. Well, is there any --16 MR. HADDAD: We insure through the insurer. 17 THE COURT: -- other basis for objecting or stating 18 that the plaintiff's construction of the policies is incorrect? 19 MR. HADDAD: Other than the words of the policy 20 itself? 21 THE COURT: Well, under the --MR. HADDAD: Under the --22 23 THE COURT: Other than the endorsement. 24 MR. HADDAD: The endorsement, the testimony is --25 THE COURT: But is there anything beyond the

endorsement?

not --

MR. HADDAD: It's the case law that I've -- that we've cited in our briefs including the New Amsterdam versus Moss case.

THE COURT: But again, Moss was a case where there wasn't going to be insurance, right? Here the -- there is insurance, it's just that Delphi's bankrupt or insolvent. But the statute sets up the Agency, SIP to pay --

MR. HADDAD: Well, no, but --

THE COURT: SIF to pay if it's insolvent. So it's

MR. HADDAD: No, actually what the statutes does is if the insured -- the self-insured does not pay, and in 2009 after saying for years that they were going to pay it, and in fact, after continuing to pay, which is perhaps why, as Your Honor suggested, there was no large premium there for all those years, either before or during the bankruptcy, what the self-insurance fund does is they look, and this is undisputed, both in Mr. Elsenheimer's affidavit and also Mr. Schrock's testimony, is you look primarily to the self-insured during the period of time that they are an approved self-insurer, and so long as they are carrying out their function, we're fine with that.

Here -- and once they stop, you look to see who else is on the risk for this and you --

Page 97 1 THE COURT: I understand that but --2 MR. HADDAD: -- come to a Delphi -- to ACE, and they 3 filed these forms for the agency, they issued these policies, 4 and --THE COURT: I'm just addressing the following point. 5 The Michigan statute does not -- let's put it this way. 6 7 Michigan statute is complied with if an employer is approved as a self-insurer notwithstanding that it is later insolvent or 9 bankrupt. So they have complied with that statute that far, 10 right? 11 MR. HADDAD: Up through a point in 2009 when the self-12 insurance was revoked by the director --13 THE COURT: Right. 14 MR. HADDAD: -- at which point the insurer comes up --15 THE COURT: But to me that's --16 MR. HADDAD: -- because they have to have --17 THE COURT: So -- but leave that aside. But to me 18 that distinguishes Moss. 19 MR. HADDAD: No, because --20 THE COURT: Because there's insurance. It didn't pay 21 because it was insolvent, but the statute recognizes that. Now 22 I understand that if there is additional insurance, obviously 23 the state has the right to enforce that insurance, no question. But the issue is whether there is additional insurance. 24 25 MR. HADDAD: And under 621.4, each policy of insurance

1 covering worker's compensation in this state shall contain the 2 following provisions. The very first thing it says is 3 notwithstanding any language elsewhere contained in this 4 contract or policy, the insurer issuing this policy, hereby contracts and agrees with the insured employer, and that 5 insured employer is set forth right here in this document on 6 7 the Michigan law endorsement as being Delphi --8 THE COURT: But --9 MR. HADDAD: -- and as Mr. Groves so testified it's 10 Delphi, and we cannot disregard that testimony. THE COURT: But the policy doesn't go to anyone other 11 12 than the --13 MR. HADDAD: Well, that's what they chose --THE COURT: -- who it's issued to. 14 15 MR. HADDAD: Well, that's how they chose to do it and 16 that's one of the questions Your Honor had earlier with respect 17 to well, what does this mean for the bankruptcy case. And, you 18 know, whatever that means as between ACE and Delphi --19 THE COURT: But again, it says the insurer issuing the 20 policy hereby contracts and agrees with the "insured employer." 21 MR. HADDAD: Right. 22 THE COURT: So if you're not insured, again, if you 23 are not Packard Hughes, but you're Delphi, then you don't fit within 4. 24

MR. HADDAD: But that's not what the policy says.

Page 99 1 THE COURT: Well --2 MR. HADDAD: On this endorsement or under the Form 400 3 or the testimony of the witness. I mean, I don't see how we 4 can interpret a policy to ignore --THE COURT: Well --5 MR. HADDAD: -- each of those fundamental evidentiary 6 7 points here --8 THE COURT: All right. MR. HADDAD: -- on a motion for summary judgment. 9 10 THE COURT: On --11 MR. HADDAD: The only way you can interpret it is our 12 way. 13 THE COURT: Well you certainly -- not only can you, 14 you must if the plain language of the policy is clear. MR. HADDAD: Well, I think it says "Delphi." 15 16 THE COURT: Because the testimony wouldn't come in, 17 and the Form 400 wouldn't come in as evidence. It might be a 18 separate basis for a liability, but that's not in front of me, but it wouldn't come in as evidence. So again, I think I'm 19 20 just coming back to the meaning of this endorsement. And since 21 it's tied into and required by a statute, which says the 22 insurer issuing this policy hereby contracts and agrees with 23 the insured employer, you know, if the policy doesn't make sure 24 the particular employer, I don't see how the insurer could be 25 issuing the policy or someone else could be viewed to be

covered by this provision. It doesn't fit.

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It would basically create a new obligation. Now, I understand your point that because they've listed Delphi as the named insured, they may be doing that in this provision.

MR. HADDAD: They've done that not only -- I mean, not just in this provision, but with the exception of the first year or so --

THE COURT: Well, no, I understand.

MR. HADDAD: -- every other year, they listed them in the schedule of additional named insureds, they listed Delphi Corporation, and then they listed all those locations. So that's --

THE COURT: Well, but I'm asking is there anything else in the policy besides the endorsement --

MR. HADDAD: Well --

THE COURT: -- that shows or that contradicts the plaintiff's argument that, in fact, everything other than what is covered by the -- I'm sorry, put it -- everything that it excludes the locations covered by the access policy, the retention policy.

MR. HADDAD: Well, then went ahead and listed all those other locations of Delphi Corporation --

THE COURT: But they have an exclusion. They have an exclusion provision.

MR. HADDAD: And that's why you come back to, Your

1 Honor, we keep coming back to the endorsement which says, don't 2 look to those, don't look to those, because you're creating the 3 very ambiguity that the statute and the policy and the public policy of the state is designed to prevent. THE COURT: But the statute doesn't -- I don't -- the 5 statute doesn't -- to me the policy of the statute doesn't --6 7 isn't, offended by this. It would be offended in my first 8 hypothetical, where they go by location, but it isn't offended 9 if you go by entity. Because the purpose of the statute is not to split up entities. I'm sorry, not to split up locations. 10 11 Split up entities by location, as opposed to go by entity-by-12 entity. 13 MR. HADDAD: Well, this entity says -- I mean, I don't 14 know how many times you want me to say it, Your Honor, it says 15 Delphi Corporation plain as day, that's what their witness --16 THE COURT: But it is -- that is the --17 MR. HADDAD: -- has so testified. 18 THE COURT: -- insured. I mean, the policy was 19 obtained by Delphi Corporation. 20 MR. HADDAD: Yeah, and it says you're the named -- you 21 are the insured employer --THE COURT: Well, it doesn't say that. 22 23 MR. HADDAD: Well, it says -- well, it says you are 24 the insured employer.

THE COURT: But that's doesn't explain who -- you're

Page 102 1 supposed to know who "you" are. "You" are the one who's 2 insured. 3 MR. HADDAD: Well, you know, we don't get the 4 policies. What we get is the Form 400, so from what the public records reflect is, it's Delphi Corporation. And for year 5 after year after year for policy after policy after policy, 6 that's what ACE decided to file with the State of Michigan as a 7 matter of evidence --8 9 THE COURT: Well --10 MR. HADDAD: -- to the extent that you believe that 11 perhaps they didn't mean that, then what explanation is there 12 for why they did that. There's no affidavit from any person 13 from ACE explaining how this policy was prepared, who's --14 THE COURT: But again --15 MR. HADDAD: -- the insured employer. 16 THE COURT: -- that's if the plain meaning doesn't 17 apply here. MR. HADDAD: You couldn't -- I mean on this -- in 18 19 looking at these two pages, the plain meaning -- there's no 20 other meaning, frankly, Your Honor, that that could reach. 21 THE COURT: Of course there is. Of course there is. 22 MR. HADDAD: From looking at these two pages --23 THE COURT: Of course there is. We know that there 24 are other entities who are employers who are insured here.

They didn't list them.

05-44481-rdd Doc 21986 Filed 11/08/12 Entered 11/09/12 11:32:07 Main Document Page 103 MR. HADDAD: We're only talking about this one 1 2 particular one, Delphi, and you know, we didn't take discovery 3 on --THE COURT: Well, that means then you're saying that the others aren't insured? 5 6 MR. HADDAD: No, we haven't got -- I haven't looked 7 into that. I don't know if there's been a claim at issue or an adversary proceeding brought by ACE to fight that, I have no idea. 9 10 THE COURT: Well, just -- look, to me, you should know 11 who "you" are; you're the one who's insured. 12 MR. HADDAD: Well, I think that --13 THE COURT: It's in this policy, which refers to 3A, 14 which says who you're insuring, who's insured, which is the 15 ones who are listed. 16 MR. HADDAD: No, now let's -- hold -- no. 3A just 17 says Michigan. 18 THE COURT: Right. MR. HADDAD: Full stop. It doesn't go anywhere beyond 19 20 that. I think this is a very important point because --

21 THE COURT: Well, as -- for 2000 and 2001 it does list

22 them.

23 MR. HADDAD: It does.

24 THE COURT: You're right. But for the other ones, you

25 have to go to the exclusion.

MR. HADDAD: And you shouldn't go to the exclusions, because the only thing that the endorsement says is you look to 3A, you don't look to 4, you don't look to exclusions, you don't look to other endorsements, you don't look to premiums, and you don't look to classifications, and you don't look to -you don't look to any of that. You don't look to any of that under this endorsement under the Michigan law, because you can't have a situation where the employer -- where the insurer is saying, you know, that policy we issued said Delphi Corporation and filed that Form 400, just kidding, you can't have that situation, Your Honor. THE COURT: Why? MR. HADDAD: Why? THE COURT: Yeah, as a matter of --MR. HADDAD: Because that would wreck havoc upon -- I was thinking --THE COURT: No, no, separate and apart from the Form 400 argument. MR. HADDAD: All right. That's a pretty big argument as a matter of evidence. THE COURT: No, no, no, I'm just -- I'm focusing on the plain meaning at this point. The purpose of the Michigan law endorsement again is not based on 621, is not to, again, act as a black hole to pull an insurer in wherever one entity in Michigan is insured.

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MR. HADDAD: And the insurer can --

THE COURT: That's not the -- the reason is, again, not to split up insurance within an insured entity.

MR. HADDAD: The insurer can issue a policy to subsidiary A and ignore the parent company if they so choose.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. HADDAD: They chose not to. You know why? I don't know why, but when I'm looking at this policy --

THE COURT: But how did they choose not to? Other than --

MR. HADDAD: I'm looking at this policy and I say, wow, look at this, this covers worker's compensation insurance and employer liability insurance and all other state's insurance, and it lists all kinds of states, and all kinds of different things. It has lots of stuff in it. I mean, it's hundreds of pages, it has lots of different provisions in it.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. HADDAD: One of the things that they decided is well, we're going to do worker's compensation in Michigan. And if they want to issue this policy, and in 3A, 2008, and the earlier years, they just say Michigan. Okay. Well, if they want to play in that arena, if they want to issue those policies in the State of Michigan, then they have to comply with that statute, and they have to provide this level of insurance because every employer, every employee needs to know

Page 106 that --1 THE COURT: But why haven't they complied with the 2 3 statute? MR. HADDAD: I think they have complied with it, they 4 5 just don't want to pay. 6 THE COURT: No, no, let's assume that they're correct in their argument that they only insured the specific entities 7 that were not self-insured. Why didn't that comply with the 9 statute? MR. HADDAD: Well, it's Delphi's job to comply with 10 11 the statute. 12 THE COURT: Right. 13 MR. HADDAD: It's ACE's job to issue a policy that conforms with that statute and is enforceable in accordance 14 15 thereof. 16 THE COURT: Well, why didn't Delphi comply with the 17 statute? 18 MR. HADDAD: I don't think we're saying --THE COURT: They did, didn't they? 19 MR. HADDAD: I don't think we're saying Delphi didn't 20 comply with the statute --21 22 THE COURT: But why didn't the insurance comply? MR. HADDAD: -- until they stopped paying. 23 THE COURT: Yeah. But why didn't the insurers comply 24 25 with it?

1 MR. HADDAD: When they said they're not paying, that's 2 the point. Up till then they filed their Form 400 --3 THE COURT: No --4 MR. HADDAD: -- they run the risk and as long as 5 someone's paying. THE COURT: Okay. But they don't have to be on the 6 7 risk to comply with the statute. They can exclude themselves 8 from the risk and still be complying with the statute. MR. HADDAD: But they chose not to by doing precisely 10 what they did here, by issuing this policy with this 11 endorsement by filing that Form 400, year after year after 12 year. 13 THE COURT: Well, again, the Form 400 is not part of this --14 15 MR. HADDAD: I think it's --16 THE COURT: -- as part of a plain meaning analysis. 17 If I get into parole evidence, it will be, but it's not part of 18 plain meaning analysis. So again, it seems to be you're 19 putting the cart before the horse by saying they haven't 20 complied when --21 MR. HADDAD: No, I didn't say -- you asked me what are 22 they doing to not comply, not paying. The issuance of the 23 policy that includes this endorsement, in fact, does comply. 24 That is compliance with the statute, by issuing this 25 endorsement with these words on it, and with those terms, that

complies with the statute, and now they've just to go to do what they've committed to do. They just have to actually do this. They have to agree with the -- they have to agree and make those payments, provide those cases, provide the medical services and the rehab and the compensation, and you know, those unfortunate situations, the funeral services. That's what they're required to do after having signed up for insurance in the State of Michigan. That's what they have to do.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?

MR. HADDAD: I mean, we have another points that we made in our papers --

THE COURT: Well, let's assume we're not on the -- I mean, I understand that there are issues with respect to the reformation argument in the summary judgment context, but I'm really not focusing on anything beyond plain meaning at this point.

MR. HADDAD: Well, the plain meaning, you know, going back to E, it says "the scope of the contract is all the businesses that the said employer is engaged in at the time of the issuance of this contract."

THE COURT: Right.

MR. HADDAD: All the businesses.

THE COURT: Right, but it's the "employer."

MR. HADDAD: Well, if you're going to allow them to

nine years later, see that policy, just kidding, that's not who we meant, that's not who we meant in employees of Delphi, that's not who we meant, State of Michigan. We can't allow that to happen.

I was thinking of different types of analogies as driving over this morning, it's like the recording act with the mortgages, it doesn't matter that you had some other thought in your mind, if you don't file that mortgage, you don't get the coverage. It's like a letter of credit, it doesn't matter what's going on in the third side, you have to -- between the third party. You have to comply with the strict terms of the document, you have to comply with the strict terms of the statute, and an insurance company that issues this endorsement year after year after year, has to be held to comply with it, because it says right there, plain as day, Delphi Corporation. And that's what their witness says it means. And for them to ask for summary judgment on the --

THE COURT: But they're --

MR. HADDAD: -- basis that their own witness says that's not what that means, well, that is -- I don't see that.

THE COURT: They're only not complying with it if in fact they're the employer.

MR. HADDAD: If, in fact, the named insured is --

THE COURT: Delphi is the employer.

MR. HADDAD: If, in fact, they would come up with a

new interpretation of the document to say that Delphi

Corporation doesn't (indiscernible) corporation, it meant some

other subsidiary of Delphi Corporation whose name you cannot

divine from looking at these two pages.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HADDAD: And I don't think that that's a basis, and quite frankly it's the opposite. I think that under the basis of what we have here, the Michigan defendants are entitled to summary judgment.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HADDAD: And we have put forth, as I said a number of other arguments in our papers, so I think we're --

THE COURT: I mean, besides the arguments that go after a plain reading argument, I think the only one you raised is the standing point or more appropriately the necessary party point. But isn't -- I mean, isn't it right that the interest of the injured employees, the employees entitled to worker's comp is completely represented here by the Michigan defendants?

MR. HADDAD: No. I mean, I certainly think that Ms.

Cyganowski and myself, Mr. Raterink and my colleagues have adequately explained why summary judgment should be granted in favor of our clients, but I think that when you look at the statute, 418.651, each employee is entitled, in his or her own name, to enforce their rights directly against the insurance --

THE COURT: I understand they have --

MR. HADDAD: So that is a --

THE COURT: -- the direct right, but the -- they're going to get paid one way or the other, right, so they have less of an incentive than the Michigan defendants do. The Michigan defendants are the one that really want to win there, because it's their money if it wasn't the insurers' money. But one way or another, the worker's comp claim is going to get paid.

MR. HADDAD: I'm not sure.

THE COURT: Well, what, because the State of Michigan is insolvent? I mean, it seems that they've been --

MR. HADDAD: You know, if they want to -- if the goal here is to increase the taxes on every employer in the State of Michigan, I don't know. But it seems to me that when you have a statute that provides a party with a right, you can't take away that's party's rights without noticing here, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, the case law says just the opposite.

For purposes of the necessary party rule, if the Michigan

defendants are adequately representing the interests of those

parties, then they don't have to be joined.

MR. HADDAD: I -- you know, I think you have to defer to the individuals to see how they felt about that.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HADDAD: But from our perspective, I mean, I think we have demonstrated to this Court and to Your Honor why the

summary judgment can and should be granted in favor of the Michigan defendants, compelling ACE to live up to the terms of its own policy it puts in the endorsement. I mean, from that perspective, I think that Your Honor can issue summary judgment in favor of the Michigan defendants. I don't see it working the other way. I don't see it working the other way when their own witness contradicted the very position that they're seeking to take on this motion. When they say something is clear, when their own witness testified to the contrary, and the document doesn't say that either.

And he said the policy covers -- page 70, this policy covers worker's compensation liability for Delphi Corporation.

That's the witness' testimony, and they're bound by the testimony of their own witness. You can't avoid that, Your Honor. You can't avoid that.

THE COURT: On an issue of law?

MR. HADDAD: It doesn't matter what its issue is.

It's an issue of what does this policy insure, that's the issue that's presented to this Court, and their witness said Delphi Corporation. The question wasn't objected to, it wasn't corrected at the time, thereafter in his errata sheet or any other time. And I don't see how we can disregard that testimony.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. HEUER: Your Honor, I'm happy to address the Court

if you have any questions for us. But our interests are adequately represented. We've said that.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. HEUER: William Heuer, Duane Morris.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, why don't we -- I'm -- I'd like to hear from plaintiffs and maybe Delphi on the issue of endorsement, but first on the Grove deposition, the Groves deposition.

Are the plaintiffs bound by Mr. Groves' testimony that the insured employer is Delphi Corporation?

MR. OLSHIN: I think Mr. Heuer will address that issue, Your Honor.

MR. HEUER: William Heuer, Duane Morris. Your Honor, first, the case law is clear that where an opponent goes back, an affiant goes back and amplifies or explains their testimony, that's entirely acceptable.

When we look at the deposition transcript, it's important to read what was asked, and what was said, not only at the two points in time referenced by counsel, but also when the questioning was brought on by my colleague, Ms. Welsh (ph). Because at first, the question goes to exactly what you've been talking about for the last few minutes, what name is on top of that endorsement. Delphi Corporation is on top of it.

The follow-up question, there's another follow-up that reads off the page, it says, points to the page and says, what

does it say there. Fine. Go back to page 86 of the deposition, because that's where the question is specific, and it's relevant. The question talks about which entities are shown as being insured in the State of Michigan. It's not a broad question of who's the named insured, he's not pointing to Delphi Corporation as being on the top of the page, and asking about the insured (indiscernible), it's very specific. Which are the insured entities in Michigan? And the answer there was specific, Delphi Diesel, Mechatronics and PHI.

Now, the affiant got his deposition transcript. He sent it in, he signed it, and came back with a supplemental affidavit. That affidavit explains that the points he made later in his deposition are exactly what he meant. He explains the testimony. That's precisely what is provided for in case law.

There are a number of cases in the Second Circuit that go right into this. One case in particular, Langman, L-a-n-g-m-a-n, Fabrics v Graph California, it's at 160 F.3d 106. There you had a situation that had multiple depositions, one affidavit, a second affidavit, and the question was, does that affidavit contradict, because you can, where it's a sham affidavit situation is the word the case law used, disregard it.

But where it explains, it amplifies, where the question that was asked originally wasn't really precise or

Page 115 doesn't really get to the issue, you can explain that through a supplemental affidavit. That's exactly what was done here. It was permissible in Langman. In fact, in Langman, the Second Circuit said it was error for the district court not to allow that supplemental testimony. So we believe that supports our position, Your Honor. MR. HADDAD: Your Honor, can I speak to that, Your Honor? THE COURT: Sure. MR. HADDAD: At page 86 of Mr. Groves' --THE COURT: He's not talking about the endorsement, he's talking about something else. MR. HADDAD: No, at page 46 of the -- at page 86 of the transcript, he was shown the exclusion page, and one narrow page. He wasn't talking to the entirety of the policy, he was talking to that one little page, page 2647. THE COURT: I think you were going to say something else, which is that he wasn't talking about the Michigan law endorsement. MR. HADDAD: And he also was not talking about the Michigan law endorsement. He was talking about page 2647. That's exactly what he was talking about. MR. HEUER: He was talking about --MR. HADDAD: Not the endorsement or the policy itself, which my question on page 70 was. It was about the policy.

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Page 116 MR. HEUER: But with due respect --1 2 THE COURT: But the question wasn't about the policy. 3 Read your question, it was about the endorsement. 4 MR. HADDAD: The page 86 was responding to Mr. 5 Olshin's testimony -- questions. THE COURT: No, I understand, but your question on 66 6 7 was about the endorsement, not about the policy as a whole. 8 MR. HADDAD: Page 70 was about the policy. Page 70, 9 the last question before we broke for lunch was very 10 specifically --11 THE COURT: Yeah, but it does. 12 MR. HADDAD: -- was the --13 THE COURT: That doesn't bother me, because it's not qualified by Michigan. It does cover worker's compensation 14 15 liability of Delphi. I mean, in --16 MR. HADDAD: So that's -- wow, that's an interesting 17 interpretation. THE COURT: Well, I mean, it's what it says. You 18 19 know, the first rule is just answer the question. 20 MR. HADDAD: He answered the question. With respect 21 to each time I asked about the policy and the endorsement it 22 said Delphi was the named insured, and was the insured 23 employer, that's what he said. 24 THE COURT: Well, on 67 --25 MR. HADDAD: On 66.

1 THE COURT: -- no, he -- as far as --2 MR. HADDAD: And after he corrected his testimony 3 once, and you get a shot at correcting your testimony, that's 4 what Rule 30 provides, you get a shot at correcting it. You 5 don't keep getting shots. I mean, you don't keep getting 6 shots. Gee, when I read it, that's not what I meant, but I 7 still didn't correct it until now in reply on summary judgment. I don't know that that -- I don't see a case that so provides. 9 MR. HEUER: Your Honor, the question was clear, "What 10 entities are shown for being insured in the State of Michigan?" 11 The answer was very clear. 12 THE COURT: That's fine. 13 MR. HADDAD: (indiscernible) THE COURT: I didn't understand that. 14 15 MR. HADDAD: On 2647. 16 THE COURT: Okay. So on the Michigan law endorsement, 17 why isn't "you," as used in paragraph 2 there, Delphi 18 Corporation as opposed to someone else? 19 MR. OLSHIN: I'm sorry, Your Honor, I didn't hear the 20 question. 21 THE COURT: What Mr. Haddad is arguing is that in the Michigan law endorsement, it states, "to help you understand 22 23 the paragraph, the following definitions are added." Number 2, 24 "You are the insured employer." 25 MR. OLSHIN: Right.

THE COURT: So Mr. Haddad says, well, "you" must be, mean Delphi Corporation because it's the only name on this endorsement, besides the insurer.

MR. OLSHIN: I think Your Honor hit the nail on the head. I mean, I think you have to go back and look at who was actually the insured employer in the State of Michigan.

THE COURT: So you're saying "you" means "you know who you are, you're the one who's insuring."

MR. OLSHIN: Yes, and you know who you are because you're listed on the Michigan extension of information page by name. Otherwise, their position is illogical. Because Delphi had ten or so entities that were at various times, and you named some of them, Packard Hughes, Delphi Diesel. So to use their interpretation, what this endorsement would do is it would make those entities not covered by the policy, because their name doesn't appear on this piece of paper, even though it appears on the Michigan information page. Because their reading of the policy is, you don't look at the policy as a whole, you just look at this piece of paper.

Secondly, I think if you follow opposing counsel's logic to an extreme, then the endorsement doesn't apply at all to 2001, 2002, and I'm sorry, 2000, 2001 and 2003, because Michigan doesn't appear on the information page on page 1 of those individual policies.

That can't be the intent of what is happening here.

The intent has to be -- I know the other side doesn't like to talk about intent, but when you read the policy as a whole, a policy that's approved by the Michigan Insurance Department.

So from a carrier's point of view, the only reason we're using this document is because a regulator has told us we can.

And the regulator based, on Mr. Grody's (ph)

affidavit, Exhibit 2, which is uncontested, approved not only

the general section of the policy, but also approved the

designated workplace exclusion endorsement.

So one would think that if those concepts were contrary to Michigan law, the regulator who's charged with approving policy forms would have rejected those policies, and not allowed us to issue them in the State of Michigan.

I think, Your Honor, the only conclusion you can draw is, the only logical way to read this policy is that this endorsement is part of a whole. And you have to interpret the whole. And there's nothing inconsistent between this endorsement and the concept that these entities which weren't approved to be self-insured are now the employer insured under the policy. It runs totally together.

The general conditions of the policy which exclude other insured and self-insured locations are consistent with the concept, as is the designated workplace exclusion endorsement.

MR. HADDAD: Two quick responses here. They're trying

to read way too much into submitting a form to a regulator. The policy wasn't approved, the form was approved. You can put any exclusion you want in your form so long as your Michigan law endorsement that's part of it, which is part of any submission. So long as you have that, the exclusionary language that you put in the back pages of it don't apply. THE COURT: I mean other than --MR. HADDAD: So that doesn't address the issue of this policy. THE COURT: Right, but let me interrupt you. Other than the point, and I do take that seriously, believe me, that

the named insured is listed as Delphi, there's nothing in Michigan law or in the endorsement that would require the endorsement to expand the coverage. It all hinges on who "you" is, right, who the reference to the employer is.

MR. HADDAD: Right. And what -- let's look at this from the big picture from the State, the point was earlier is the State qualified to advance the interests of the employees here. Let's look at it from the State's perspective from the big picture.

We get a Form 400, that's the only thing we get. We don't get these policies. We don't get the policies until years later if there's a dispute. So as far as we're concerned, Delphi Corporation is an insured employer, and that's what they told us from -- every year from 2000 all the

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way up until 2009. That's what ACE said, we didn't tell them 1 2 that. They said it. 3 We cannot -- this Court cannot, and we submit no court 4 should be in a position to tell the State of Michigan, now all of a sudden if you want to make sure that people are doing this 5 6 the right way, you now have to start reading every single 7 policy of every single employer in the State of Michigan to decide whether or not there's an exclusion, this, that, or the 9 other thing. Your Honor sees how big these policies are. 10

THE COURT: No, I don't --

MR. HADDAD: We only need to know, we only need to know that we have this. Once we have this, as Mr. Schrock testified, once we know that the policy's been issued, the name's Delphi, we know what the terms of that insurance are. It covers all their businesses in all the locations --

THE COURT: But what is --

MR. HADDAD: -- in that state.

THE COURT: But what -- let's just assume that, in fact, the employer is Delphi.

MR. HADDAD: I'm sorry?

THE COURT: Let's assume for the moment --

MR. HADDAD: Right.

23 THE COURT: -- that for purposes of this endorsement,

it means that the covered employer is Delphi? 24

MR. HADDAD: Okay.

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1 THE COURT: What good does that do the regulator? 2 MR. HADDAD: What good it does the regulator is 3 precisely this. As soon as Delphi stops making good on its 4 self-insurance commitment, as soon as they are no longer an 5 approved self-insurer, we now know ACE Insurance Company, which 6 issued this policy on these dates year after year after year 7 filed its reports with the state, with this Form 400, year 8 after year after year, is on the hook and is going to pay these 9 people and the --10 THE COURT: But the statute doesn't say that. 11 MR. HADDAD: I think the statute does say that. 12 THE COURT: Where does the statute say that? 13 MR. HADDAD: The statute says every policy for the 14 issuance of insurance in worker's compensation insurance in 15 this state will provide as follows. And the first thing it 16 starts out with is notwithstanding the language to the contrary 17 THE COURT: But, no, listen --18 19 MR. HADDAD: -- that's where it provides. 20 THE COURT: -- maybe I wasn't clear. There's no reliance at the time by the regulator on this endorsement 21 22 saying one thing or the other. 23 MR. HADDAD: You don't need reliance, Your Honor. 24 estoppel doesn't apply against --25 THE COURT: No, but I mean, I'm not talking about

that. I'm just saying it doesn't serve any purpose, other than to enforce the policy.

MR. HADDAD: My house fire insurance doesn't serve any purpose until my house burns down. I mean, that's -- it's just there. It's just there, and in the event something happens, then we look to it, and we say, I expect you to pay. I expect you to pay because that's what you wrote in this policy.

I mean the worker's compensation agency needs to know who's the insurer, all these employees, all the cases --

THE COURT: I mean, I can see that argument for the Form 400. I guess I just don't really see it to something that's attached to the policy itself.

MR. HADDAD: Well, when it's attached to the policy itself, in accordance with the Michigan law, and in accordance with the statute, and it's unambiguous, and it says "you," and the only other reference on this to "you" is Delphi Corporation, you can't interpret it any other way. You can't interpret it any other way. Your Honor. "You" means "you." I don't mean to talk (indiscernible). What the definition of "you" is, but "you" means "you," and "you" is Delphi. Because there is nobody else. There is nobody else referred to here. There's nobody else referred to in item 3A, on all those policies from 2002 to the present.

THE COURT: I just -- I follow you with this, but I think you're changing the subject. As far as saying that all

that counts is this endorsement, I'm having a hard time seeing that. There's no regulatory policy of that.

MR. HADDAD: Oh, I disagree. There absolutely is a regulatory policy. It's set forth in the statute, Your Honor. And the statute says, we want to make sure that every policy contains these terms --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. HADDAD: -- and is enforceable in accordance with these terms, and we provide these terms, and we say Michigan law requires that we attach this paragraph to your policy, and the language specified by the statute. And to help you understand the paragraph, the following definitions are added, and we are the insurer issuing this policy, and you've got to look to where's the only -- well, it's ACE, because that's the authorized agent at the end, issued by, name of insurance company, and two -- look at the third line, issued by, name of insurance company, ACE, that's we and you are the insured employer. There's no one else listed on this document.

THE COURT: But the statute says that the insurer "issuing" the policy hereby contracts and agrees with the insured employer. I mean --

MR. HADDAD: Yeah, and the definition provides who the insured employer is. It can't be anyone else other than who it says plain -- in black and white on the page.

THE COURT: Okay. I guess we disagree on that. "You"

Page 125 1 are the one who's been insured. 2 MR. HADDAD: I'm sorry? 3 THE COURT: "You" means the one who's been insured. MR. HADDAD: You --THE COURT: "You" are the insured employer. You are 5 6 the one that's been insured. I mean, you're saying to me that 7 8 MR. HADDAD: There's nothing in the definition of 9 "you" that refers you to anything other than this page. It 10 doesn't you are the insured employer as defined in section such 11 and such, it does not say that. 12 THE COURT: No, it says, you are the insured employer. 13 MR. HADDAD: That's all it says, and the only name, 14 there's a you and a we. Named insured, Delphi --15 THE COURT: We are the ones issuing the policy. 16 MR. HADDAD: That's ACE. 17 THE COURT: And that policy doesn't cover --18 MR. HADDAD: It covers you. Covers you. Who's you? 19 THE COURT: Let's say they put down name of insured, 20 and let's just say the person was really having a bad day, so 21 she put down Mr. Haddad instead --22 MR. HADDAD: Uh-huh. 23 THE COURT: -- this would control? And the only one 24 insured is Mr. Haddad, employer of two employees in Michigan. 25 I mean, it can't be that. That can't be right.

Page 126 1 MR. HADDAD: But you can't extend this to the absurd. 2 THE COURT: This totally modifies the contract. 3 MR. HADDAD: But this is named insured Delphi, they 4 did it every single year for year after year and you can't just 5 say dozens of people made dozens -- hundreds of mistakes going 6 through this year after year after year. 7 THE COURT: With the Form 400s? 8 MR. HADDAD: What's that? THE COURT: With the Form 400s? 9 10 MR. HADDAD: With the Form 400s, yeah, I wasn't going 11 there, I was talking about the policy itself, which kept saying 12 you is Delphi, but we can read that into it. 13 THE COURT: Delphi is the insured under the policy. 14 It's the insured. That's why I'm not particularly -- I mean, 15 you did ask in a separate question, which is, is he the insured 16 employer. But his first answer is right, Delphi was the 17 insured. 18 MR. HADDAD: Yes. 19 THE COURT: I mean, it was insured, it insured Delphi 20 in Alaska and Alabama. 21 MR. HADDAD: Yeah, but I also asked him with respect to this endorsement. 22 23 THE COURT: I understand. 24 MR. HADDAD: And that's the critical question. 25 THE COURT: I understand, but I think --

1 MR. HADDAD: I wasn't talking about Alabama and 2 Alaska, and they didn't interpret it that way either. 3 THE COURT: So he got tripped up on that. 4 MR. HADDAD: I don't think he was interpreting it that way either. He was very clear when I asked him those were the 5 questions that were put there, and in the global question at 6 7 the end, and individual questions, he keeps tying right back to Delphi being the named insured, it's exactly what's in the policy that was issued by this company. 9 10 I mean this authorized agent, the person whose name 11 appears here, we don't have an affidavit from that person 12 telling us what they thought when they signed this. We don't 13 have anything like that, Your Honor. 14 THE COURT: If I find it's clear, I'm not supposed to 15 get it. MR. HADDAD: Well, I understand that. 16 They're the 17 ones asking for reformation. My view is --18 THE COURT: I'm not focusing on reformation. I'm 19 really not --20 MR. HADDAD: -- I think it could be enforced in 21 accordance with that language because that's who the insured 22 is, Delphi. 23 THE COURT: All right. Anything else? MR. HOGAN: Your Honor, Al Hogan for DPH. I've been 24 25 lucky enough to be here many times. I think as in the past

Your Honor has apprehended all of the points with respect to the Michigan law endorsement.

I think you apprehended later on, and I think you posited a hypothetical, if the name insured up here instead of saying Delphi Automotive Systems Corporation and Delphi Corporation, if it had listed out Delphi Packard and Delphi Hughes, the entities that were intended to be covered that were the non-self insured entity, there would be no problem under Michigan law. And I don't think that the Michigan defendants disagree with that.

And so then I think the only question you focused on in the last few minutes is does the Michigan law endorsement require you to read Delphi Corporation as the named insured as also being insured employer. And the reason why I don't think you do that is because this Michigan law endorsement is not a free standing policy, it's attached to a policy. It actually says that.

It says the Michigan law requires that we attach this paragraph to your policy. Again, it's referring to the "you."

Who is "you?" I think you have to go and look at the policy.

This Michigan law endorsement is a form and in the context of this policy which I'm sure there are some that it was complicated, but not many that was complicated for Michigan employers, I don't think you can lift this endorsement out, look at one page and say, we can figure out who the insured

employer is by looking exclusively at this page.

I think it's completely reasonable, as Your Honor has, to focus on the entirety of the policy, and look at to who the actual entities are that were covered under the Michigan information page. And then you said something that I think really seals it, and that is, interpreted the way the Michigan defendants would have it, the resulting policy would result in a situation where you have the self-insured entity, Delphi Corporation also covered by this duplicative coverage, but you would have all of the non-self insured entities totally unprotected. The reading that they espouse would result in finding that for its entire history, all of these various unself-insured entities were actually out there acting in violation of the worker's compensation law.

And so when you read a contract, and you look at one page and it leads up to an absurd result, but when you back up and read the entire contract and it leads you to something that is not inconsistent with the statute, and appears to line up with exactly the way the rest of the policy works, I think that's what contract interpretation is all about. And I think that's where the discussion has led us.

So we agree with ACE's reading of it, we agree with your skepticism that the named insured somehow modifies the entire policy for our purposes.

MR. HADDAD: Your Honor, may I just respond to Mr.

Hogan?

Two points. If we want to talk about an absurd result, an absurd result is not enforcing the contract as written. But beyond that, think about what occurred in the Titan case from earlier this year, the Supreme Court. The insurance applicant committed fraud, he actually committed actual deliberate intentional malicious fraud against the insurance company and get the policy. And the State said, well, there's a minimum basis of insurance, and once you issue a policy, you're bound to that minimum amount of coverage. With respect to something beyond that, that's between you and the insurance coverage, and I'll let you at least contest that issue, but you're bound to this.

Applying that here, once they issue this policy, they're bound to this level of coverage for Delphi. How is the State supposed to know otherwise? What -- how are we supposed to know oh, the fact that they filed this, the fact that they prepared this, the fact that they issued this year after year after year, we're going to come -- and the time comes to pay that we're just not going to pay.

How is a State, how is --

THE COURT: They'd read the policy.

MR. HADDAD: We're going to read the policy of hundreds of thousands of employees -- of employers in the State. As you can see, there are hundreds and hundreds of

pages long, or do we just apply the State's policy, public policy as set forth in its own statutes by -- enacted by its legislature, signed by its governor which says, every worker's compensation policy will provide this. That way everybody knows. Employers know, employees know, and insurer's --THE COURT: But it does provide this. You're just saying --MR. HADDAD: To whom? To the person --THE COURT: -- that this means they are the employer. MR. HADDAD: That's what it says, that's what I'm saying, and I don't see how a state can interpret it any other way. I don't see a state can be compelled to look behind that -- how an agency can be compelled to look behind each and every policy that's issued in the state to make sure what's in there, what's excluded, what's not excluded. It doesn't work that way. THE COURT: It's going to sue on a policy. It'll sue on the policy. MR. HADDAD: It'll sue on the policy. It needs to know that this policy is going to be enforceable. We're not going to get into this question of the who is "you." That not is a question, that this statute's designed -- the statute is designed to prevent that question before --THE COURT: The statute is designed to prevent you

having to go against two insurers for the same company.

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MR. HADDAD: Excuse me?

THE COURT: The statute is designed to prevent you if, again, the insurance policy had provided that it was going
to cover half the people at Packard Hughes, then that would not
be enforceable. They would be bound by this endorsement,
because they're not allowed to cover half. That's what binds
them. They have to cover everyone at the insured. That's the
purpose of the statute.

MR. HADDAD: To cover all of the employees --

THE COURT: At the insured.

MR. HADDAD: -- of "you," and "you" is Delphi, and we can't look behind that, Your Honor. I think that poses an unreasonable burden on --

THE COURT: I guess --

MR. HADDAD: -- the State. I think it's contrary to the public policy as enunciated in the state and in the legislature and in the --

THE COURT: Why is -- there's nothing to say it's an unreasonable burden. I read these policies this morning. I read them between the hours of 8:30 and 9:30. I went through -- I think I asked pretty good questions and I got it. You know, I mean, it's not that burdensome. And there's no preregulatory purpose. The pre-regulatory purpose is all based on the dealing with self-insurers, and whether they're allowed to self-insure. This is just gravy.

Page 133 So other than not being able to split up people with the insurer, yeah, look at the policy. I mean, it doesn't override the contract that way. It doesn't say if you get it wrong, you're bound. It doesn't say that. It doesn't say if you put down the wrong name, you're bound. It says that the -again, it says that "the insurer issuing this policy hereby contracts and agrees with the insured employer," and among other things that in E --MR. HADDAD: Yep. THE COURT: -- "this insurance contract or policy shall for all purposes be held and deemed to cover all the business the said employer is engaged in." But it doesn't

vouch, it doesn't say we represent and warrant that we are the insurer and you are the employer.

MR. HADDAD: Yeah, well, I would disagree with that. It says --

THE COURT: It doesn't say that.

MR. HADDAD: -- we're the insurer issued by, name of insurance company, ACE.

THE COURT: Issuing this policy.

MR. HADDAD: Issuing this policy, named insured, Delphi Corporation. You are the insured employer. We now have to look to hundreds of pages --

THE COURT: All right. That depends --

MR. HADDAD: -- and I know Your Honor could do that

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because --

THE COURT: -- on who "you" is again. That doesn't depend on the fact that, you know, they've signed it. I just -- I don't -- you know, the policy says who it covers. And which is, you know, the employer. It doesn't say that you are the employer.

MR. HADDAD: Well, it says, you are the insured employer.

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. HADDAD: It does say, you are the insured employer. It doesn't say Delphi Diesel is the insured employer, it says "you," and the only "you" here is Delphi Corporation, and to hold otherwise would be to read something into this endorsement that does not apply, when the endorsement itself says, any provision to the contrary in this policy, Your Honor, any provision to the contrary elsewhere in this entire policy is deemed modified hereby and conflicting provisions are made null and void.

Anything not in harmony with this is deemed modified. So if you want to say -- if this Court wants to say, if ACE wants to say, well, there's provisions in this policy that suggests that the insured employer is someone else, that's modified by this. That provision, Your Honor, H, conflicting provision, that's a very critical provision here. It modifies everything else in those hundreds of pages to harmonize it

right with this. And that's the provision, Your Honor, we pointed that out in my opening comments. It all keeps coming back to that. The remainder of the stuff that Mr. Olshin's colleagues point to in their papers, it has to be modified and harmonized to comport with this, and this says "you" is Delphi. And that's what that says, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

Okay. I have before me two motions for summary judgment in this adversary proceeding. I have a motion by the Plaintiffs, ACE American Insurance Company and Pacific Employers Insurance Company, which I sometimes refer to "ACE." And I also have a motion for summary judgment by Defendants, State of Michigan Worker's Compensation Agency, and State of Michigan Funds Administration, which I sometimes refer to as the "Michigan defendants."

As a threshold matter, it was contended in the first time in this very long running adversary proceeding by the Michigan defendants that I cannot determine this motion without adding as a necessary party all of the ultimate beneficiaries of the insurance policies at issue, and that is, all the actual and potential worker's compensation claimants employed by any of the arguable employers covered by the policies at issue.

I conclude, though, that such people are not indispensable to this litigation, given that their interests are adequately represented by the Michigan defendants. Indeed

it appears to me to be the case that the Michigan defendants, in fact, have a greater interest in succeeding in this litigation than the individual worker's compensation claimants. That is because this litigation is about who will pay that portion of the worker's compensation claims that is not paid in tiny bankruptcy dollars by the Delphi debtors; i.e., whether the insurer plaintiffs will pay or the Michigan defendants pay.

Either way, it appears clear to me that, although payment has been delayed as a result of this litigation, the worker's compensation claimants will ultimately be paid by either the plaintiffs or the Michigan defendants.

Consequently, Michigan worker's compensation claimants' interests are adequately represented in this particular litigation as to who shall pay. See generally Continental Casualty Company v. American Home Assurance Company, 2008 WL 1752231 S.D.N.Y. (April 14, 2008) at page 4. See also National Union Fire Insurance Company of Pittsburgh v. Mason Perrin and Kanovsky, 709 F.Supp. 411, 415 (S.D.N.Y 1989), and Midwest Employers Casualty Company v. East Alabama Health Care, 170 F.R.D. 195, 198 (MD Ala. 1996).

And turning to the summary judgment motions; under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), incorporated by Bankruptcy Rule 7056, the Court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there's no genuine dispute as to any material fact and is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Subject to the relevant sections of the Rule, a party asserting that a fact cannot be raised as generally disputed must support the assertion by citing to particular facts -- I'm sorry, to particular parts of the record, including depositions, documents, or electronically stored information, affidavits, or declarations, stipulations, admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials, or by showing that the record does not establish the absence or presence, as the case may be, of a genuine dispute, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c)(1).

The movant bears the initial burden to satisfy each material element of its claim or defense. Vermont Teddy Bear Company v. 1-800-BEARGRAM Company, 373 F.3d 241, 244 (2d Cir. 2004); Isaac v City of New York, 701 F.Supp.2d 477, 485 (S.D.N.Y 2010), aff'd, 271 Fed. Appx. 60 (2d Cir. 2008).

To contest such a showing, the non-moving party must provide evidence of a genuine issue of material fact to successfully oppose the motion. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp, 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). Facts are material if they might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The Court is "not to weigh the evidence but is instead required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, to draw all reasonable inferences in favor of that party, and to eschew credibility assessments." Amnesty Am. v. Town of W. Hartford, 361 F.3d 113,

122 (2d Cir. 2004).

Thus a summary judgment motion may not be defeated by conclusory or self-serving statements, by simply raising metaphysical doubts about a material fact, or by identifying immaterial disputed facts, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 247-48, and Matsuschita Electric, 475 U.S. 586, although "if there is any evidence in the record from any source from which a reasonable inference in the non-moving party's favor may be drawn [on a material issue], the moving party simply cannot obtain a summary judgment." Binder & Binder PC v. Barnhart, 481 F.3d 141, 148 (2d Cir. 2007); see generally Matsashita Electric, 475 U.S. at 586.

Of course, where the parties do not dispute the material facts, disagreeing instead on the outcome based on applicable law, the matter is appropriate for summary judgment. Adirondack Transit Lines, Inc. v. United Transp. Union, 305 F.3d 82, 84 (2d Cir. 2002). That is true, among other factual contexts, in contexts where the parties are disputing the plain, unambiguous meaning of a controlling document or documents. See Vermont Teddy Bear Company v. 1-800-BEARGRAM, 373 F.3d at 244. That is because, "if a contract is unambiguous on its face, its proper construction is a question of law. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 906 F.2d 884, 889 (2d Cir. 1990).

In such situations, of course, the Court should not

look beyond the plain language of the contract to parol evidence, Arcadian Phosphates, Inc. v. Arcadian Corp., 884 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir. 1989): see also In Re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc., 147 B.R. 855, 861-62 (Bankruptcy S.D.N.Y. 1992).

Here, the ACE insurers' motion seeks summary judgment, as Mr. Olshin noted, on three different issues. First, it seeks summary judgment on whether the insurers are liable under deductible policies issued to Delphi Corporation or its predecessor for years 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008 insofar as it is asserted that those deductible policies insure claims against Delphi and its subsidiaries and affiliates that are self-insured.

Separately, the ACE insurers' motion seeks summary judgment declaring that if, for some reason, the foregoing policies do not provide unambiguously for the limitations in coverage that the motion asserts, that the policies should be reformed under Michigan law to so provide.

And, third, the motion seeks a declaration on a summary judgment basis that under separate, so-called retention policies for the applicable years, the insurers have no obligation until the self-insured retention is covered (those policies being excess policies over the self-insurance carried by the Delphi entities named in those policies).

The Michigan defendants seek summary judgment declaring that, to the contrary, the deductible policies that

I've listed do, in fact, provide for insurance not only for unself-insured subsidiaries of Delphi, but also for Delphi and its self-insured subsidiaries and affiliates.

As set forth at the start of this hearing, there's no dispute that there is not a relevant deductible policy for the October 1, 2002 through October 1, 2003 year, and, therefore, that there's no basis for liability on the deductible policy theory for the ACE insurers [for that year].

In addition, it's undisputed that the retention policies do not create additional drop-down liability; i.e., that there's no coverage owed by the insurers until the self-insured retention is satisfied. Therefore, as far as those two points are concerned, the insurers' summary judgment motion is granted.

The insurers base their summary judgment motion in respect of the deductible policies issue on three contentions, which they combine together in an overall context, but which I have uncoupled in light of my view that the applicable deductible policies are in fact unambiguous and plainly provide that they cover only the Delphi subsidiaries covered thereby pursuant to the policies' plain terms, as I'll explain in a moment.

I therefore conclude that it's inappropriate to consider, in addition to the plain meaning arguments that the ACE insurers make, the ACE insurers' arguments that parol

evidence, including documents submitted by underwriters and to third parties, go to establish or help to establish their interpretation of the contract.

I have considered the insurers' other argument,
however, which is a statutory argument but I did not base my
ruling on the insurers' statutory argument. Rather, I base it
on my view of the plain meaning of the applicable policies.

But I should address the statutory argument first.

The insurer's contend that under the controlling statute which is MCL 481, and, more specifically, MCL 481.611, and arguably 621, the Delphi entities were -- who are self-insured, were precluded by law from separately obtaining insurance under the deductible policies from the ACE insurers.

As I stated, this argument is primarily based on Michigan Compiled Laws, Section 6.11. That section states, "Each employer under this Act [which is the Worker's Disability Compensation Act], subject to the approval of the director, shall secure the payment of compensation under this Act by either of the following methods: (a) by receiving authorization from the director to be a self-insurer. In the case of an individual employer, the director may grant that authorization upon a reasonable showing by the employer of the employer's solvency and financial ability to pay the compensation and benefits provided for by in this Act, and to make payments directly to the employer's employees, as the

employees become entitled to receive the payment under the terms and conditions of this Act, and pursuant to regulation 408.43(c) of the Michigan Administrative Code, if the director determines it to be necessary, the director shall require the furnishing of a bond or other security in a reasonable form and amount. Such security as may be required by the director may be provided by furnishing specific excess insurance, aggregate excess insurance coverage through a carrier authorized to write in this state, in an amount acceptable to the director, a surety bond, an irrevocable letter of credit format acceptable to the bureau, and claims payment quarantees; (b) by insuring against liability with an insurer authorized to transact the business of worker's compensation insurance within the State of Michigan." And then it is also pointed out that insurance can be obtained for worker's compensation obligations by a pooling of insurance.

The ACE insurers contend that by using the word -- the phrase "either of the following methods," the statute is written in the disjunctive, so that only one of the following methods may be used.

I do not read the statute so narrowly. It doesn't preclude a combination of the following methods. Although it is the case that where an individual employer does not make a sufficient showing of its solvency and financial ability, the director may require additional security only in the specified

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means set forth in subsection (a), which does not include a deductible policy like the ones at issue, nevertheless, I do not believe that the plain reading of the statute specifically precludes the issuance of insurance through a deductible policy while at the same time the insured is self-insured for worker's compensation.

The ACE insurers' interpretation is also belied,
although only as a matter of practice, not as a legal matter,
as a matter of interpretation of the statute, by the
Eisenheimer affidavit. Now, Mr. Eisenheimer is in fact the
director, so I should accord deference to his interpretation of
the statute over which he's been placed as the director, and I
do so; and he notes that there are many instances, although a
minority, where, in fact, such a situation where a self-insured
employer also obtained insurance for worker's compensation
through a deductible policy.

All things considered, then, it appears to me that there's not a plain meaning statutory preclusion to the obtaining by the self-insured Delphi entities of additional deductible insurance. I'm not willing to place preclusive emphasis on the word "either" under these circumstances, somewhat additionally cautioned not to do so by the Supreme Court's recent wrestling with the meaning of the word "or" in a statute, Radlax Gateway Hotel LLC (ph) v Amalgamed Bank (ph),

I'm not persuaded that the other section of the
Worker's Disability Compensation Act cited by the ACE insurers
adds anything to their argument. They state that MCL Section
418.621 bolsters their argument that a self-insured employer
cannot also obtain a deductible policy. They rely on
418.621(2), which states, "The state accident fund and each
insurer issuing an insurance policy to cover any employer not
permitted to be a self-insurer under section 611, shall insure,
cover and protect in the same insurance policy, all the
businesses, employees, enterprises, and activities of the
employer."

And then they point also to Subsection 4 of that section, which states, "except as modified by the director as provided for herein, each policy of insurance covering worker's compensation of this state shall contain the following provisions."

Subsection 2 does not contain the preclusion of the issuance of a separate policy. It just states that a state accident fund issuing an insurance policy to cover an employer not permitted to be a self-insurer, as opposed to an insurer under Section 611(1), shall insure all of the business, employees or enterprises covered by that employer.

That is, I don't believe it has the preclusive effect that is argued by the ACE insurers. Clearly, there's no case that makes that argument under Michigan law.

It's argued by the insurers that the retention policies that they issued don't have to have the Michigan law endorsement set forth in Subsection 4 of 621; however, I don't believe that that again is a bar to the issuance of a deductible policy where an employer is self-insured.

So as a summary judgment matter, I do not find that the Michigan statute -- statutory sections, relied upon by the ACE insurers entitle them to the relief they're seeking in the context of their administration by the Michigan worker's compensation insurance structure.

I do, as I said, though, find and conclude that the plain meaning of the applicable deductible policies requires the grant of the ACE insurers' motion. I have carefully gone through each of the deductible policies as well as closely questioned ACE's counsel on the meaning of their terms. And it is clear to me, from that review, that by their terms each of the policies excludes Delphi Corporation or Delphi Automotive System Corporation, it's predecessor, which is listed at the top of each policy as the named insured, and its affiliates and subsidiaries doing business in Michigan except as specifically provided in each of the policies.

With the exception of relying upon the so-called "Michigan law endorsement" that appears in each of the policies in the same form (except with the changes to the named insured as being Delphi Corporation) or Delphi Automotive Systems

Corporation, the Michigan defendants do not contest the plain meaning interpretation set forth by the ACE insurers. Nor do I believe they could given the plain meaning of the applicable policies.

Most of the policies, that is all the policies besides the 2000 and 2001 policies, specifically exclude from the coverage of the policies in a designated workplace exclusion endorsement all of the entities who are covered by the named retention policy in the exclusion. A sample exclusion, which is in essence the same in each of the policies that I've listed, that is, the policies other than 2000 and 2001, can be found at Bates number 002498 in respect of the 2008 policy.

Page 1 of that policy and page 1 of the other policies that have the exclusion specifically states, "this policy includes these endorsements and schedules, see schedules of forms and endorsements," which refers to, among other forms, the designated workplaces exclusion endorsement.

With respect to the 2000 and 2001 policies, each policy provides that part 1 of the policy applies to the worker's compensation law of the states listed here, and refers the reader either to "a per information page attached." The policies cover many states besides Michigan. And certain states including Michigan have their own information page attached.

The information page attached for Michigan appears at

Bates number 000348 with a 2000 policy and Bates number 000830 for the 2001 policy. It lists only specific entities in each of those attachments or information pages. For the 2001 -- I'm sorry, for the 2000 policy, Packard Hughes Engineering Service, Delphi Diesel Systems are listed, and for 2001, Allied Signal Environmental Catalyst is listed.

It is clear from that construct that the terms of the policies and the insureds under the policies with respect to Michigan entities, are limited, therefore, to those entities and no others.

With respect to those two policies, that's supported by general sections A and B of the policy which refer to the employer named in item 1 of the information page, and again, the face page of each of those policies states that part 1 of the policy applies to the worker's compensation law of the states listed here, "per information attached," or "information page attached," excuse me. It has not been argued to the contrary with respect to those two policies by the Michigan defendants.

The Michigan defendants did argue in their memoranda that various other insureds' extension endorsements in the other deductible policies and extension of information pages, such as appear in the 2008 policy at Bates number 002520 and 2521, argue that those were places in Michigan and entities, Delphi entities, doing work, and those places are covered by

the policies, but I conclude that the exclusion page and exclusion endorsement that appears in each of the policies controls with respect to those policies, very clearly providing that the policy does not cover, or conducted at or from the entities listed in those policies that I referred to in the exclusion endorsement.

At oral argument, the Michigan defendants made it clear that they were relying as far as plain meaning is concerned only on the Michigan law endorsement, which I referred to earlier; and, again, a sample of that appears at Bates number 002650. The purpose of the Michigan law endorsement is to comply with the section of the Michigan Worker's Disability Compensation Act that I previously quoted, Section 418.621.

That section and subsection 2, again, provides that "[t]he state accident fund and each insurer issuing an insurance policy to cover any employer not permitted to be a self-insurer under Section 611, shall insure, cover and protect in the same insurance policy, all the businesses, employees, enterprises, and activities of the employer."

The insurers argue that this requirement only applies to insurers issuing a policy that doesn't cover the self-insurer, and therefore would not apply to the deductible policies to the extent that it's argued by the Michigan defendants that they actually do cover self-insurers.

Paragraph, or subparagraph 4 of subsection 621 states, "Except as modified by the director as provided for herein, each policy of insurance covering worker's compensation in this state shall contain the following provisions." And, in fact, those provisions which appear in subsection 4 are then stated in the Michigan law endorsement that appears in each of the deductible policies. Again the sample being 0002650.

That endorsement, as required by the statute, states, "Notwithstanding any language elsewhere contained in this contract or a policy of insurance, the accident fund or the insurer issuing this policy hereby contracts and agrees with the insured employer," and then subsections A through G set forth the contract mandated by Section 418.621(4).

In each section, it is clear that the undertaking, whether it's for compensation, medical services, rehabilitation services, funeral services, scope of the contract, obligations, assumed termination notice or the like, applies to obligations for workers or workman's compensation or medical or rehabilitation or funeral services or the like, which the insured employer may become liable under the provisions of the Michigan Worker's Compensation Act during the life of this contract or policy.

That is, the contractual undertakings refer to the "insured employer" under the specific contract or policy of insurance. For example, subsection E, "scope of contract,"

says, "that this insurance contract or policy shall for all purposes be held and deemed to cover all the business the said employer is engaged in at the time of the issuance of this contract or policy, and all other business, if any, the employer may engage in during the life thereof, and all employees the employer may employ in any of his businesses during the period covered by this policy."

And the last undertaking in the Michigan endorsement - H -- states, "That all the provisions of this contract, if
any, which are not in harmony with this paragraph are to be
construed as modified hereby, and all conditions and
limitations of the policy, if any, conflicting herewith, are
hereby made null and void."

The first clause of the Michigan law endorsement states, "This endorsement applies only to the insurance provided by the policy, because Michigan is shown in item 3(a) of the information page." My reading of that language means that it applies literally only to the insurance provided by the policy, the word "only" modifying the first noun after it, which is "insurance provided by the policy."

I do not believe, as is argued by the Michigan defendants, the word "only" modifies the word "because;" i.e., that this endorsement is being provided only because Michigan requires it. I believe that, consistent with all the references to the policy and to the employer, the first clause

of the policy makes it clear, it applies only to the insurance provided by the policy. I.e., it does not create a new policy as far as the insured and the insurer. Instead, it requires that the policy be modified as set forth in provisions A through H of the endorsement.

Nevertheless, the Michigan defendants contend that even if, as I've found to be the case, the applicable deductible policies do not cover Delphi Corporation, and that Delphi Corporation is not the insured employer under those policies, the Michigan law endorsement renders Delphi Corporation the insured employer.

The Michigan defendants contend this because above the Michigan law endorsement is a field which states the named insured is Delphi Corporation under a specific policy number, with the effective date of the endorsement, and setting forth the policy period and the insurer.

The listing of Delphi Corporation in that field again lists it as the main insured. It does not list it as the insured employer. And it is the insured employer, and then the specific policy, that subsections A through H, which are required under MCL 418.621(4), refer to. However, the Michigan law endorsement also includes the following provision, "Michigan law requires that we attach this paragraph to your policy in the language specified by the statute. To help you understand the paragraph, the following definitions are added.

(1) We are 'the insurer issuing this policy'; (2) You are the 'insured employer', 'Michigan Workman's Compensation Act means the Workers Disability Compensation Act of 1969, Workman's Compensation means worker's compensation, the Bureau of Workman's Compensation means the Bureau of Worker's Disability Compensation'."

The Michigan defendants contend that the statement
"You are the insured employer" refers to the named insured on
the page, Delphi Corporation, notwithstanding the fact, as I
found at least, that the insurance policies do not provide for
insurance for Delphi Corporation and instead provide for
insurance for specific entities that are listed on the Michigan
information pages for the 2000/2001 policies or are listed in
the information pages in the other policies to the extent not
excluded by the exclusion endorsement.

The Michigan defendants argue that the reference to "you" in the Michigan law endorsement can only mean Delphi Corporation. I conclude, however, to the contrary. I believe the reference to "you" in this endorsement can apply only to the you, the entity, that is, in fact, insured under the applicable policy, consistent with all of the references to the policy in the endorsement and, most specifically, consistent with the fact that ACE American Insurance Company is the insurer issuing this policy only in respect of a policy that provides insurance coverage for a specific entity.

And as I found none of the policies provide specific insurance coverage for Delphi Corporation under the Michigan worker's compensation statute, to read the Michigan law endorsement as the Michigan defendants have argued, would have the effect of actually excluding the entities who are, in fact, insured under the applicable policies, since they are not listed as the named insured in the field that is at the top of the endorsement.

It is clear to me that the listing at the top of the field for Delphi Corporation properly lists "the insured," since Delphi Corporation is "the insured" under the applicable policy, but that it does not refer to the actual insured employer for purposes of the Worker's Compensation Act of Michigan because those employers are specifically identified in the applicable policies.

In addition, the Michigan law endorsement is made part of the insurance policy itself, and, in light of that, I find that no provision of the policy in fact does conflict with the Michigan law endorsement, in that the endorsement refers to the specific insured employer under the specific policy and that, or those, insured employers, as I believe are uncontroverted, have not breached any of the undertakings set forth in paragraphs A through G of the endorsement or as required by MCL 621 -- I'm sorry 418.621(4).

Consequently, I conclude that as a matter of law the

plain meaning of the statute -- of the contracts, requires the grant of the ACE insurers' motion, and the denial of the Michigan defendants' motion, for summary judgment. As noted, interpretation of a contract is a matter of law; as a result, I conclude that Mr. Groves' admission at line 16 of page 66 of his declaration -- that the "insured employer" in paragraph 2 of the Michigan endorsement is Delphi Corporation is correct -- is irrelevant to my determination.

In addition, it is clear both from his deposition and his supplemental declaration, which does not conflict with that admission that I've just cited to that he, like ACE generally takes the position that the applicable policy that he was being questioned on does not provide for insurance for Delphi itself but only for the specific entities that are not excluded and/or that are covered on the extension of information page in the policy. See page 86 of his deposition.

I believe that in the context of the questioning, I can and should consider his supplemental declaration, for what it's worth. But, again, ultimately, I conclude based on my reading of the contract as a whole and the applicable statute that requires the Michigan endorsement, that the plain meaning of the contract is clear, and that the Michigan endorsement does not rewrite the contract to provide for a different insured employer, namely only Delphi Corporation but, rather, provides that the contract, to the extent that it would provide

to the contrary, (and, in fact, it does not provide to the contrary), but if it provided for the contrary, rewrites the contract so that for the actual insured employers it conforms with the undertaking set forth in paragraphs A through G of the Michigan endorsement -- A through H, excuse me, as well as set forth in A through H of Subsection 621(4) of Chapter 418 of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act.

Given that interpretation of the contract on its plain terms, or the contracts on their plain terms, it is unnecessary for me, and frankly improper for me, to get into the issue of reformation and evidence as to the parties' intent at the time of forming the contracts, since as I've found, the parties' intent is clear from the contracts themselves, and as I've ruled, requires the grant of the insurers' motion.

So, I will ask counsel for ACE to submit an order granting its motion for summary judgment in the three respects that I've ruled on: first as to the 2002 policy, second as to the retention policies, and third as to the plain meaning of the deductible policies, and consequently, denying the motion for summary judgment by the Michigan defendants.

You don't need to settle that order formally on notice to the Michigan defendants and DPH, but you should e-mail a copy to them before you e-mail it to chambers so that they can make sure it's consistent with my ruling.

MR. KAMENEC: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And you don't need to repeat all the conclusions of law set forth in my bench ruling, just refer to the bench ruling.

MR. KAMENEC: We will do that, Your Honor.

THE COURT: As I often do when I give a long bench ruling, I will look at the transcript of the ruling, and I may edit it, not only for typos, and miscitations but for content. If I do that, I will file it separately as a separate bench ruling, which won't be the transcript but rather an amended and corrected bench ruling. But the holding won't change so you don't need to wait for that process before you can send up the order.

MR. KAMENEC: Understood, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

MR. HOGAN: Your Honor, if I could, just one brief housekeeping matter, Al Hogan again for DPH Holdings. Just in terms of taking stock of where we are in the adversary proceeding at this point for a moment --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. HOGAN: -- I believe that Your Honor's order today will resolve all of the affirmative claims that the insurer sought in the adversary proceeding, but I'll confer Mr. Olshin on that.

I also believe that Your Honor's ruling will dispose of the counterclaim that the Michigan defendants asserted in

their response to the adversary proceeding, and we can work that out.

THE COURT: To enforce the policy.

MR. HOGAN: To enforce the policies.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. HOGAN: In addition, Your Honor, DPH Holdings filed counterclaims and cross claims against the insurers and the Michigan defendants, respectively, the basic point of which was that assuming that Your Honor ruled that there was no coverage under the deductible policies for subsidiaries that were otherwise self-insured, then the insurers would have no right of recovery that -- against DPH Holdings on an administrative claim basis.

Stepping back, Your Honor, the reason we've been here in this court --

THE COURT: No, I understand.

MR. HOGAN: Right. And so we haven't filed a motion on that yet. I just wanted to flag the issue, but I don't think Your Honor's ruling today necessarily, as a matter of what you ruled today, disposes of all the claims. Having said that, what I'm going to do is I'm going to reach out to Mr. Olshin, talk with him and see if it does. If it doesn't, we'll advise you of that, I'll advise you of that in some way, shape or form.

I'll consider what the effect is on our cross claims

against Michigan. They didn't respond to those directly, but I don't' think they've ever asserted that under the Form 400 there was a way to come back against DPH. The bottom line point is here --

THE COURT: That was the whole point of it being separate.

MR. HOGAN: That's right. So the bottom line point is

I think this ruling may very well effectively end all of the

adversary proceeding. I'll confer with counsel to see if

that's the case, and when Mr. Olshin submits the order, he may

indicate to here to whether that is in fact their final order.

THE COURT: Well, if the order wants to contain a provision that grants you your relief on the counterclaim, that's fine with me. Given the prior history in this case, I'm quite confident that that is not going to be the last ruling, and that there will be an appeal. And I -- it isn't before me, but it's likely that if it didn't, if the order didn't have that tying up of that one loose end, I probably would still permit an appeal under Rule 54, so I don't think that should enter your strategy at all in dealing with this, I'm saying to all of you. It's really a pretty -- an issue from the Michigan insurers' issue, so otherwise, you know, that's just off the top of my head, but I have a feeling that I would permit an appeal under Rule 54, notwithstanding that it would only be resolving some and not all of the adversary.

Page 159 1 MR. HOGAN: I understand, Judge, and just flag the 2 issue. We may have a resolution when the order --3 THE COURT: Right, and that's fine. 4 MR. HOGAN: -- comes in and if we --5 THE COURT: I mean, it logically makes sense to tie 6 that up, as opposed to having -- tied up by stipulation. 7 MR. HOGAN: Right. THE COURT: If you want to have a separate stipulation 9 too, it says, if in fact this order is final, then we waive, 10 you know, then DPH gets its judgment. 11 MR. HOGAN: Okay. Thank you, Judge. 12 THE COURT: Thank you. 13 (Concluded at 2:34 PM) 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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Page 161 1 2 CERTIFICATION 3 I, Sheila G. Orms, certify that the foregoing is a 4 5 correct transcript from the official electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter. 6 7 Dated: October 18, 2012 9 10 11 12 Signature of Approved Transcriber 13 14 Veritext 15 200 Old Country Road 16 Suite 580 17 Mineola, NY 11501 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25